I will start with Amendment 48 in the name of my noble friend Lord Moylan. With it, I will take his Amendments 52 and 53, together with Amendment 59 in the name of my noble friend Lord Mancroft and Amendment 60 in the name of the noble Lady, Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb.
It is evident that there is a rather wide range of views in the Committee about which animals should be recognised in this Bill as sentient. Some noble Lords wish to see the scope of the Bill immediately broadened to include decapods and cephalopods; others additionally wish to see the exclusion of certain classes of vertebrates. As drafted, the Bill defines an animal as a non-human vertebrate—that is, an animal with a backbone. The scientific evidence is clear that vertebrate animals can experience pain and suffering. It is on that basis that the definition of “animal” in the Animal Welfare Act 2006 extends to vertebrates.
Government policy will continue to be guided by scientific evidence. That is why we have future-proofed the Bill with a delegated power for Ministers to add different species of invertebrates to the definition of “animal” by regulation. We will use this power where supported by robust scientific evidence. This corresponds to the similar delegated power contained in the Animal Welfare Act. I am mindful, of course, that this House has mixed feelings about the inclusion of delegated powers such as this in public Bills. It is rightly expected that Ministers offer a good reason for their inclusion. I can assure your Lordships that we would not have taken the trouble to seek this power if we were not prepared to use it when needed. I can confirm that new additions to the remit of the Bill—new species—are subject to an affirmative resolution, so noble Lords can scrutinise them.
On Amendment 56, my noble friend Lord Trenchard would, had he been able to speak to it, have sounded a note of caution regarding the delegated power in the Bill. I can assure him that such a power will be exercised appropriately, as I said. That is why the affirmative resolution process applies; Parliament will have the final say on any extension to the Bill’s scope. If either House is not satisfied that Ministers have good evidence to justify their use of the delegated power, then its use can be vetoed. We know that scientific research is a continuous process and new evidence on sentience will emerge over time as our understanding increases. That is why we have included the delegated power. I am aware there may be different views on the inclusion of a delegated power in the Bill. However, this power is necessary to allow us to recognise other species as sentient if there is sufficient evidence to support it, and I can confirm we intend to use the power if that is the case.
Naturally, when we talk of possible extensions to the Bill’s scope, many noble Lords are thinking primarily about its extension to decapods and cephalopods. This is reflected in Amendment 57 in the name of my noble friend Lord Moylan, as well as Amendment 49 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman of Ullock, and Amendment 51 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. As noble Lords know, my department has commissioned an independent review of the available scientific evidence on sentience in decapod crustaceans such as crabs and lobsters as well as sentience in the cephalopod class, which includes octopus, cuttlefish and squid. I can confirm that the report will be published before the Bill returns to the House on Report.
We want this Bill to stand the test of time. Our understanding of animal sentience has developed in recent years and will continue to do so. I say to my noble friend Lord Moylan that I would be reluctant to do away with the ability to extend the Bill’s scope to other species, subject to parliamentary approval, if that is what the evidence calls for.
Turning to Amendments 55 and 58, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, I am not sure whether there is anything to be gained from explicitly excluding or including foetuses and embryos from the committee’s remit, as the noble Baroness’s amendments would require. In practice, it would be difficult for the committee and government departments to identify the way in which a policy under consideration affects the welfare needs of a foetus or embryo, as opposed to those of the mother animal. It is therefore unlikely that the committee could find itself considering a policy beyond its remit.
To conclude my remarks on what species the Bill covers, I recognise that there are strong views advocating for many different directions. We want to ensure that any extension of the recognition of sentience is informed by engagement with the evidence from experts and stakeholders. Parliament can expect us to weigh the evidence carefully, with the assurance that it will always have the final say on the matter.
I saw and was profoundly affected by the documentary “My Octopus Teacher”, which has been frequently quoted. Other than the beauty of that particular animal, it also showed the healing power of nature for the individual who made that film. It is one of the most remarkable programmes that I have seen for a very long time.
I turn now to Amendment 50, in the name of my noble friend Lord Robathan, which seeks to refine the scope to kept animals. Your Lordships might wonder what is the point of recognising the sentience of animals that are outside human control, such as wild animals—the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, made this point. It is simple: these animals are sentient and equally capable of feeling pain and suffering. Sentience is not a capacity limited to those animals under the control of man, nor does government policy impact solely on kept animals. There are numerous ways in which a government policy might affect wild animals. Crucially, we share an environment. Hence we should not limit the committee to considering the sentience of kept animals alone.
I will answer various points that have been raised. To my noble friend Lord Moylan, I will quote Rousseau’s Discourse on the Origin and Basis of Inequality Among Men: animals should be part of natural law
“less because they are rational than because they are sentient”.
I do not usually pray him in aid—his writings led to the French Revolution and the Terror—but I think that, in this case, he was right.
Like many others, my noble friend Lord Robathan referred to the words “Trojan horse”. I do not understand why they keep being used in the context of the Bill. The Trojan horse was a special forces operation, as he should be well aware, and it led to the sacking of a civilisation. I do not see that it has any corresponding circumstances here.
Finally, my attention was drawn to something in Hansard on 25 July 1979—so in the first few weeks of the then Conservative Government—where an MP who then went under the name “Miss Fookes” asked the Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food
“what progress has been made with the Government’s review of their animal welfare policy”.
She was clearly on the march on animal welfare matters even then. In his reply, the Minister, Peter Walker—obviously late of this parish—set out the parameters that he thought were important for the Farm Animal Welfare Council, which is obviously a different organisation. However, his reply clearly sets out the level of expertise and—I say this to my Conservative colleagues—an enduring determination to improve the welfare of animals. It finishes:
“The actions the Government intend to take will provide a more efficient and effective means of furthering the interests of animal welfare.”—[Official Report, Commons, 25/07/1979; cols. 295-98W]
I could not have put it better than that in the context of this Bill.
Finally, as this is the last group, I thank every one of your Lordships who has spoken on the Bill today and at the previous session. As a new Member of this House, I can certainly say that its reputation as a place of careful consideration and scrutiny is well deserved. I hope that my noble friend will feel content to withdraw his amendment.