One of the worst things in this Bill, with its miasma of uncertainty, is its retrospective effect. Along with others, this amendment is designed to cure this defect. We have to stop the committee considering, let alone making suggestions to change, policies that were established in the past, that are currently being lawfully implemented and on which people base their livelihoods, food and sporting pursuits.
As it stands, the Bill would allow the committee to reopen of its own volition policies that have been in place for perhaps a century, as some of our animal welfare laws have. It could make recommendations designed to undermine the use of animals in medical research, the practice of killing animals according to Jewish law and country sports, already hedged about with qualifications and reached by consensus a long time ago. We might accept that this committee, expert or not, will consider future proposals, but we cannot let it loose on the established law.
I say this not wholly as an advocate of the positions I have mentioned but as a reminder that retrospective legislation and changes of policy are to be assumed to be a bad thing. They may undermine settled patterns
of life and livelihood, taking away certainty of freedom from criminal and civil prosecution. We cannot allow this committee to propose legislation to take away the validity of decisions made in the past and in good faith by people relying on the law as it was. In the case of the traditional Jewish way of killing animals for food, it has been permissible ever since the Jewish return to England some 350 years ago and it is established policy under UK regulations to permit it, as it was under EU legislation—although not that it could be relied on, as I explained in my last speech on this when I pointed out that the European Court of Justice allowed the Belgian prohibition of Jewish non-stunning methods.
As a legal situation, at common law, there is a presumption against retrospectivity. Article 7 of the Human Rights Act prohibits arbitrary prosecution, conviction and punishment. At common law, there is also a presumption against interference with vested interests. A leading judgment on this was in the case of Wilson v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry in 2003; one of the judges in that case, my noble and learned friend Lord Hope, is happily still with us. The judgment explained that there is a powerful presumption against statutes changing the substantive law in relation to events in the past; this is precisely what could happen if the powers of this new committee are not curbed.
There is also a presumption against legislation affecting vested rights unless Parliament is expressly making a new start for the future. So, on the one hand, recommendations by this new committee to change existing practices would be a waste of time in that, if they were acted on, they would be contrary to the rule of law; on the other hand, the Bill would accord better with human rights and the rule of law by making it express that its actions must be confined to future policy.
I hope that this amendment will be supported by the Government; otherwise, I can see legal action looming ahead on the horizon. This also applies to Amendments 18, 21, 23 and 29, all of which I support.