I thank both noble Lords, the gallant duo, for turning up to debate an important statutory instrument this afternoon. As I set out in my opening speech, decarbonising the power sector is a vital part of the UK’s effort to meet its world-leading net-zero target. While we cannot, of course, predict exactly what the generating mix will look like in 2050, we can be fairly confident that renewables will play a key role alongside firm or flexible low-carbon generating capacity, such as carbon capture, usage and storage technology and nuclear power. Net zero defines what we must achieve by 2050 but, as pointed out in the previous debate, not how to get there. We must take the necessary decisions now to deliver the resilient, low-cost, low-carbon power system that we will need to reach net zero.
The noble Lord, Lord Oates, asked about the circumstances should a developer not obtain a supply chain plan statement. If a developer fails to make ambitious, feasible and measurable commitments in a supply chain plan, it may not receive an SCP statement. However, it will have the opportunity to resubmit its application before the auction begins. Subsequently we expect that commitments made should be met. If a developer fails to implement the majority of its commitments in a supply chain plan, its CfD contract may be terminated. However, the termination of a CfD contract is very much a last resort. The purpose of the monitoring process is to support the implementation of a supply chain plan commitment that developers have freely entered into. It is in the best interests of both the Government and the developer that that chain plan commitments are implemented.
In response to the question on making explicit powers under the budget revision, we are seeking to make explicit our existing powers and not to add any new powers. Although in the May 2020 consultation we proposed making changes to clarify our ability to amend the overall budget—meaning the monetary budget—and add the ability to amend a supply cap, on reflection, we consider that we already have the power to amend the capacity cap due to the fact that the definition of “overall budget” includes both the monetary and capacity budget. Therefore, both proposed changes would make explicit existing powers which, although they exist, we consider not clear enough for stakeholders.
The noble Lord also asked about soft constraints. When deciding whether a capacity cap—maximum or minimum—should apply as a soft or hard constraint in an allocation round, we will consider what we are trying to achieve from the round generally or for specific individual technologies, including in terms of how much new capacity is supported. We also want to ensure value for money by creating competitive tension between bidders.
The noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, asked about the strike price for FOW. We will publish specific allocation round parameters in due course. We typically announce the auction parameters four to six months in advance in a draft budget notice and draft allocation framework although, of course, the exact timing differs between rounds.
On the noble Lord’s question about SCP guidance, that has been published in draft and a final version will be published in the next couple of months. The noble Lord asked a couple of other questions but, if he will forgive me, I will write to him with more detailed answers.
The changes in these regulations are varied but they are essential to ensure that CfD allocation rounds can best support the increase in the pace of renewable
deployment needed to achieve our net-zero ambitions, while continuing to consider value for money for consumers. They must be made now ahead of the next CfD allocation round, which is planned for December this year, so that developers have certainty as to who will be eligible to take part and on what basis. I therefore commend the regulations to the Committee.