My Lords, I declare my interests as set out in the register. It is a great pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Wheatcroft, and I agree with many of the points she made, not least on the antiquated, archaic references
to “peppercorn rents”. The Minister referenced how it was not expected that anybody would enforce the provision for payment of a peppercorn. Let us hope not, because if they did, the only people who would benefit would be the sellers of peppercorns, and goodness knows what shortage may be occasioned by everybody claiming and enforcing that provision. It is archaic and has no part in legislation in the 21st century.
I thank my noble friend for setting out the proposed legislation as clearly as he did; it was most helpful. Its purpose, in a nutshell, is clearly to abolish ground rents on long leases in future. I strongly welcome that and this legislation, although I think it could go further, as other noble Lords have indicated. I hope it ends the iniquitous practice, particularly of late, of claiming indefensible ground rents on property that is freehold in all but name and, in recent years, increasing—sometimes doubling—these charges from year to year. That is clearly indefensible. As referenced early on by the noble Baroness, Lady Andrews, Liam Spender, in a valuable article on the subject, said that leaseholders are too often treated as “cash cows” by some disreputable freeholders. That practice must surely end.
I understand why the legislation is not retrospective on rights that are vested long ago. I clearly see dimensions related to the European Convention on Human Rights and so on. That is reasonable. However, I want to probe with my noble friend why the disreputable practice of late of imposing unjustified ground rents is to continue. Since the Government’s declared intention is to render it illegal, why should there be an indulgence, possibly for a further two years, towards those who are putting this in contracts now? I cannot see why that needs to be the case or that the human rights argument applies in relation to it.
Further to that, I have read that it is suggested that the provisions will not be brought into force until 2023, in about two years from now. Can my noble friend indicate why that is the case, if it is? In short, when do the Government intend the Secretary of State to bring the provisions into force, under Clause 25 of the Bill—assuming that it passes according to the programme set out by the Government?
The Bill is relatively short and straightforward, but I would like to tackle some other points with my noble friend and seek his views on the Government’s intention. First, he referred to rent not being defined, because it may lead to exploitation and loopholes being sought. I do not follow that argument; I cannot see why a definition would do that. There are definitions of rent under other provisions and no cross-reference to them in this legislation. I do not think there is a definition of rent or ground rent, except in the most general terms, in this legislation. I cannot see how that is helpful. It is not, for example, clear whether a freeholder making a provision to fix buildings insurance for the leaseholder is within the definition of rent. If it is not, it presents a loophole. As I say, this is not at all clear and I wonder whether my noble friend could provide more information about the thought given to that and the possible loopholes that may arise from there not being a definition, which I can clearly see may be the case. I hope that, on reflection, the Government bring forward an amendment to add a definition of rent to the legislation, because
there are clearly practices that could be exploited by a disreputable freeholder, in much the same way as we had action on tenant fees legislation to list procedures that could be permitted. I ask the Government to give some more thought to that.
A second and related area is the permission fees sometimes imposed in such agreements—for example, for keeping a pet—when drawing up the relatively straightforward paperwork that may be needed when permission is needed under the agreement. Again, has any thought been given to restricting the exploitation of such a provision, in the same way as for the provisions that I have just mentioned? These necessary considerations could improve this legislation.
Lastly, I reference an overriding point that has been mentioned by others, including my noble friend in his introduction, on the enfranchisement of existing long leases. Clearly, if that legislation is long in coming, there is the possibility of a two-tier market in leaseholds, which—