My Lords, the legislation we are reviewing today was passed in a genuine emergency. The concern on 19 March 2020 was not whether it was too rushed, but whether it had been delayed too long. That is obviously no longer the case. Today we have all had 12 months’ experience of its operation, and even with the two-monthly reports and the current reassessment it is by no means evident that Ministers have taken full advantage of the lessons that have been learned.
It is the constitutional duty of your Lordships’ House to check, in the light of that experience, whether the Act includes what should be there, excludes what should not be there and manages appropriately what it does include. In the first category, it is abundantly clear, as has just been said, that the regulations for awarding contracts for Covid-related purposes have been woefully inadequate and that their lack of transparency has been outrageous. Each week, there seems to be yet another excuse from the Government to the courts that publication of a contract was delayed because civil servants were distracted by other Covid commitments, but once a contract was signed and sealed what were they, or indeed Ministers, doing with that contract which required even a day’s delay?
In the category of matters that were included, but clearly need not have been, the current long list of changes is ample testimony to necessary exclusions. However, we also would have expected Ministers to have corrected much earlier the confusion that the police and public encountered with charges for infringing regulations. The fact that, as at the end of February, every single prosecution under Sections 21 and 22 of the Act seems to have been found to be unlawful displays a woeful failure. That the CPS should have had to overturn 252 unlawful charges since March 2020 is a stain on our judicial system. It is important to reiterate the fact that necessary restrictions on movement, businesses and gatherings do not depend on this legislation. The Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984 would continue to exercise that control even if the House decided to take more time examining the validity of the very complicated and extensive provisions of this Act.
In the third category, the way in which the Act deals with what is legitimately included, we again have to remind Ministers that they no longer have the excuse of urgency and an unprecedented emergency. The report of our excellent Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, published just four days after the Bill was introduced in the Commons, is salutary reading. Ministers will recall that its primary recommendation was as follows:
“Whilst in no way resiling from the appropriateness of this exceptional approach, we nonetheless believe that it is important for us to state clearly that, had the country not been in the midst of a developing national emergency, there are powers in this Bill, including far-reaching Henry VIII powers, about which our commentary would have been far more trenchant and our recommendations far more robust. Given this, we have recommended
that the expiry date for the Bill should be set at one year without a power to extend—not two years, with the possibility of extension—thereby enabling the Government to exercise the powers needed in the immediate future while allowing a further bill to be introduced and subject to parliamentary scrutiny in slower time.”
Tragically, Ministers resisted that powerful advice.
The committee noted a host of Henry VIII powers for a number of very significant ministerial actions. In a number of cases, it drew the attention of this House to powers which were in no sense relating only to the coronavirus outbreak. It called for an “ironclad assurance” that they would not be used elsewhere. On what was then Clause 74, the Committee warned:
“A decision to suspend or revive emergency measures might well be politically contentious. We would expect such regulations to be subject to a parliamentary procedure.”
Even when there was a process included, as with the many Henry VIII powers, the Government proposed only the very limited negative procedure.
Nearly two weeks after Royal Assent, the Minister eventually responded to the DPRRC. He blandly dismissed recommendation after recommendation on the grounds of the
“serious and imminent threat to public health.”
He argued that the Committee’s concern over Clause 74, which became Section 88, was met:
“The regular reports to and debates in Parliament provide ample transparency, oversight and potential for challenge to the use of these powers.”
Sadly, the failure of the government business managers to enable the two-monthly reports to be scrutinised effectively has made that promise worthless.
This House took into account the exceptional urgency when it gave its consent to the Bill in March 2020. It did so with the grave constitutional misgivings of the DPRRC duly noted. Unless Ministers are now claiming that they have learned nothing from the past year and that they are as unclear on how to meet the current challenge of the pandemic as they were then, there is no justification for the House to sign another blank cheque. We should insist that the rushed, rough and ready legislation of March 2020 will no longer suffice.
Finally, today I grievously miss the usual Greaves forensic analysis—