My Lords, on this International Women’s Day, I pay tribute to the courage of and thank my noble friend Lady Meyer, and other noble Lords, for their continued engagement on this issue. As pointed out by the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries of Pentregarth, parental alienation clearly proved to be one of the most polarising issues in Committee. He challenged us to focus on the areas of
agreement and I will try to do that. It was apposite that the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, referred to the comments of the noble and right reverend Lord and said that we had a better debate today than we did in Committee. I agree. We are beginning to develop a shared understanding on where we are trying to get to on this, and to understand what points the amendment is driving at.
My noble friend Lady Meyer has lived experience of this very difficult, deeply distressing and personal issue, and 19 years of campaigning experience to boot in the area of alienating behaviours. I pay tribute to her; in no way do I seek to deny or to minimise the devastating impact that alienating behaviours can have on family life. But we must carefully consider the suggestion that legislation in the form of my noble friend’s amendment is the appropriate response here, and I hope that I can give her comfort on that. I will now outline the aspect of things that I think go to the heart of the Bill and the nub of the point that she is trying to make.
Our approach in Clause 1 is to define domestic abuse by reference to types of abusive behaviours, as pointed out by my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern and by the noble Lord, Lord Curry of Kirkharle—although he agrees with the amendment—and not by reference to the form in which those behaviours may be manifested. We are fearful of creating a hierarchy of behaviours by appearing to give more weight to one manifestation than another, and do not—as my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay said—wish to inadvertently narrow the Clause 1 definition by giving specific examples such as that proposed by my noble friend in her amendment to Clause 1(5), as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, pointed out. The behaviours to which my noble friend Lady Altmann referred would be in scope; whether the examples she cites would be covered would clearly be a matter for the courts to decide.
As I indicated in Committee, I accept that there are circumstances where alienating behaviours indicate a wider pattern of emotional or psychological abuse. However, where this is the case the definition of domestic abuse in Clause 1—subsections (3)(e) and (5) are particularly relevant, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, the noble Baronesses, Lady Chakrabarti and Lady Brinton, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, said—already applies and, as such, does not need to be further expanded.
To answer the question about statutory guidance asked by my noble friend Lady Meyer, and almost all noble Lords who spoke in this debate, the draft statutory guidance covers alienating behaviours. I am very grateful to noble Lords who have already shared their views on the guidance and we welcome further feedback and suggestions for improvement. There will then be a further opportunity to comment on the guidance when we formally consult following Royal Assent.
One of the strengths of the Bill is that it recognises the impact of domestic abuse on children, considering them as victims in their own right. From the perspective of risk of harm to the child, the relevant legal framework is provided for in Section 1 of the Children Act 1989, together with the definition of harm in that Act. My noble friend Lady Meyer and the noble Earl, Lord Lytton,
referenced the Cafcass definition of parental alienation. Although that definition supports our shared understanding of the impact of alienating behaviours on the child, it is an important point of clarification that the Cafcass definition is not one of domestic abuse—we need to be clear about that. Cafcass is clear that there are a number of reasons why a child might resist time with, or be hostile towards, one parent following separation or other breakdown of a parental relationship.
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I fully accept that the impact of decisions made by the family courts can be life-changing for parents and children, as my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern illustrated. Any allegations of harm, including alienating behaviours, should be properly and fully scrutinised by the court, as my noble friend Lady Stroud said, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, emphasised. It is for the court to decide child arrangements based on the facts of the case and with the welfare of the child as the key concern.
I listened intently to the testimony of the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, about historic court practice. I acknowledge that there is work to be done to improve the court process and particularly to ensure that the system better protects victims of domestic abuse and their children. The Government have already committed to addressing long-standing and systemic issues following the findings of the Expert Panel on Harm in the Family Courts, which the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, referred to. Specific commitments already address a number of suggestions made during the passage of the Bill in relation to this amendment: from the need for updated training and guidance across the family justice system to the importance of enhancing the voice of the child. I can assure my noble friend that there is widespread commitment to system-wide reform in this area.
The noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, asked what measures are in place to ensure expert witnesses meet practice direction 25b. Under practice direction 25b, experts must comply with the standards set out in the Standards for Expert Witnesses in the Family Courts. I thank the London Victims’ Commissioner for her thorough briefing to Ministers and the President of the Family Division on this. I might add that the domestic abuse protection orders will be available in the family and other courts. My noble and learned friend Lord Mackay was quite right to suggest that a DAPO offers a remedy in these cases.
I indicated at the start of my remarks that the Government need to listen to all sides of the debate when coming to a view on matters such as this. My noble friend will be aware that her amendment faces opposition from those representing domestic abuse victims and survivors. The domestic abuse commissioner designate, past and present Victims’ Commissioners, the London Victims’ Commissioner and Women’s Aid are all opposed to this amendment. It is incumbent upon all of us to understand why.
Adding parental alienation to the Bill could allow it to be weaponised by perpetrators of domestic abuse, as I think I have heard noble Lords say. Perpetrators who are not seeing their children because their former
partners are trying to keep those children safe could, for example, allege in turn that they are victims of domestic abuse themselves in the form of parental alienation. I am grateful to those who have raised concerns on this point, and I agree that we cannot allow survivors of domestic abuse to be reframed as perpetrators in this way.
We should further be concerned that fear of false allegations of parental alienation already present a barrier to victims telling the courts about their experiences of abuse and those of their children. I note, as other noble Lords and particularly the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, have commented, that those experiences are evidenced in the harm panel report published last year. This presents a real and serious risk which runs contrary to the purpose of the Bill.
The Bill seeks to improve our understanding of and response to domestic abuse. Although unintended, including parental alienation on the face of the Bill—in whatever terms it is described—risks silencing survivors of domestic abuse and, worse, risks further harm to survivors and their children. I acknowledge the complexities involved in this debate, but I submit that these risks must be avoided.
While I acknowledge the desire of the noble Baroness and others to include reference to parental alienation in guidance, I hope that, in the light of my explanation—and given that the Bill provides for behaviours that manifest themselves in parental alienation—my noble friend will feel happy to withdraw her amendment.