My Lords, I understand that the intent of this amendment, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, is to do two things: first, to introduce a role for the Parole Board where, otherwise, the changes in the Bill would make its role superfluous; and, secondly and at the same time, not to reintroduce eligibility for early discretionary release for this cohort.
I will begin by outlining briefly the effect of the amendment in a little more detail. It would replace Clause 27, which restricts early release for offenders convicted of a serious terrorism offence—that is, those listed in Schedule 2 to the Bill—who receive an extended determinate sentence, or EDS, or a new serious terrorism sentence so that they instead serve the full custodial term of their sentence. In its place, the amendment would insert a provision that would change the release provision for all terrorist offenders sentenced to an EDS. Further, and while I understand that this may not be the noble Lord’s intent, this amendment would also apply to those currently serving an EDS for a terrorist offence.
The replacement release provision in the noble Lord’s amendment would continue to restrict early release, but there is an important difference. At the end of the custodial term, the scheme set out in the amendment would instead refer the offender to the Parole Board. The Parole Board would then determine whether the offender represents a grave risk to the public and whether it is necessary for the protection of the public that the offender continues to be imprisoned. Under the scheme in the amendment, this consideration would continue annually until release was granted, or to the end of the extended licence period, when the offender would then be released, unconditionally, into the community. The effect would therefore be that, if release were not granted until the end of the extended
licence period, there would be a cliff edge and the offender would at that point be released unconditionally into the community. There would be no period of supervision and reintegration. For the reasons set out by the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, that is a matter of concern.
I have carefully considered the proposed changes, especially as they arise from an amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. I hope I may be permitted to say that contributions from him on this subject always merit the most careful consideration, and I can assure both him and the House that I have done so in this case. None the less, having undertaken that careful consideration, I must set out the Government’s view that the changes to the release provisions for the EDS, as set out in the amendment, would be contrary to safeguards set out in the European Convention on Human Rights and its case law governing sentencing and release. That case law is usefully summarised in a recent decision of the Supreme Court of this country in Brown v Parole Board for Scotland—we seem to be referring to Scottish cases everywhere today. It is reported at [2017] UKSC 69, in particular the discussions between paragraphs 49 and 55. While every decision of the Supreme Court is obviously a decision of a strong court, that court, for which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Reed, spoke, contained three former and current Presidents of the Supreme Court.
The reason the proposal would be contrary to the case law is that the EDS comprises two distinct parts. The first is a punitive component—namely, the custodial term—imposed for the length a judge considers commensurate with the seriousness of the offending. The second is a separate preventive element—namely, the extended licence—imposed to protect the public from the danger posed by other, future, yet to be determined serious offending. To that extent, we agree with the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, who was right to draw attention to the question of serious risk to the public. That is what the second part of the EDS does.
If the Government were to detain EDS prisoners into their extended licence period for reasons related to their initial offending, that detention would be contrary to the nature and intended purpose of the community supervision component of the sentence, and contrary to the court’s order imposing the EDS. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Reed, for the Supreme Court, put it in the Brown case,
“the purpose of detention during the extension period is materially different from that of a determinate sentence.”
The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, acknowledged that this amendment would require further development, either in the form of a new sentence or by further alteration to the existing EDS regime. I am grateful for that acceptance. However, I must state that the Government would not support such a proposal, because there is no need for such a new sentence. The EDS and the new serious terrorism sentence are deliberately structured to do two things: to provide punishment and, separately, to aid public protection and reintegration through the licence period. We have no desire to change this overall approach or, to use the metaphor of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, to change the architecture.
For those who are not dangerous, the sentence for offenders of particular concern sufficiently caters for release with a role for the Parole Board and yet without the risk of an unsupervised cliff edge, which the amendment would introduce. I understand, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, noted, that the amendment is born of a desire to introduce a role for the Parole Board. But there is no role for the Parole Board here because it is not necessary. There is no early release and no parole so, accordingly, there is no role for the Parole Board. That is, therefore, my answer to the question put to me by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, who asked why there is no role for the Parole Board. It is for the reasons I have just given. While I suspect that my answer may not leave him persuaded, I hope it means that he is no longer perplexed.
The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, asked me whether we are saying that the alternative can do a better job than the Parole Board. I accept that, as the premise behind that question would admit, some Peers consider the Parole Board the only qualified body to deal with the specialised nature of setting licence conditions for terrorist offenders. But in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, I must respectfully reject that approach. The reason the Parole Board is responsible for setting licence conditions when it directs the prisoner’s release is that that is part and parcel of the Parole Board’s decision that the offender can be safely released and managed in the community. The Parole Board decides that the offender can be released and, as part of that, decides the licence conditions that will govern such release.
However, with an EDS for a serious terrorism offence and the serious terrorism sentence, there is no provision for early release before the end of the custodial period. The corollary of that proposition is that release at the end of the custodial period is automatic. Where release is automatic, there is no reason why the Parole Board specifically should consider licence conditions.
Furthermore, offenders will be subject to management under MAPPA—Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangements—through which the police and the probation and prison services work with other agencies to manage the risks posed by offenders living in the community in order to protect the public. In cases under the Terrorism Act 2000—TACT—and TACT-connected cases, that involves the probation service, the releasing prison, counterterrorism police, security services, the Joint Extremism Unit of HMPPS, and social services.
With the creation of the national security division of the National Probation Service, we will see even greater specialism in making such recommendations. That ensures that professionals with a detailed knowledge of the offender are involved in identifying the licence conditions which are necessary and appropriate. The key point is that that happens regardless of whether the final decision-maker on setting the licence is the Parole Board or HMPPS—the governor. While ultimately the board or the governor makes the decision, that decision is always directly informed by those with intelligence of and expertise in managing the offender. I therefore assure the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, that the process is no less rigorous and the outcomes are no different.
The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, asked a specific question about our discussions with the Parole Board. We have shared the Bill with the Parole Board and discussed its implications with it, but there has not been a formal consultation, if that is what the noble Lord was driving at in his question.
For those reasons, which I hope I have explained clearly and fairly, I remain of the view that there is no role for the Parole Board where there is no consideration of early release. That point, combined with the issues I have explained around the legality of this amendment from an ECHR standpoint, leads me to consider this amendment unnecessary. I therefore respectfully urge the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, to withdraw it. Of course, I am happy to continue our conversations with him about this matter, as I am sure we will continue to benefit from an exchange of views about other matters in the Bill also.