UK Parliament / Open data

Domestic Abuse Bill

My Lords, I once again congratulate the Government on bringing forward this important Bill and on the constructive and helpful manner in which my noble friends the Ministers have all engaged with so many noble Lords to try to ensure that this legislation achieves its aim of protecting victims of domestic abuse.

I am speaking to Amendments 130 and 130A because I share the concerns expressed by other noble Lords that they may unintentionally undermine the aims of the Bill. I recognise the rationale and thinking behind them and the desire to protect children, who can be innocent victims in these awful cases, but I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, and so many others that contact with both parents is normally in the long-term interests of children. That is why I supported amendments at an earlier stage to ensure that parental alienation is taken seriously, rather than being left to statutory guidance or, as these amendments might suggest, removed from the guidance as well.

The current legal position reflects huge amounts of evidence that children benefit from contact with both parents and that significant psychological damage can be caused by loss of such contact. I therefore have serious concerns that removing the presumption of contact could cause more harm to more children than this amendment is designed to prevent. Of course, there will be dreadful cases in which an abusive parent will perpetrate harm on the children, but that is extremely rare. As the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, the noble Lord, Lord Marks, the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and others have explained, the family courts already have the power, under the Children Act 1989, to decide against contact in individual cases where it is judged to be appropriate for that case. The Act presumes only that contact with both parents will be in the child’s interests unless the contrary is shown. Should the contrary indeed be shown, rather than merely alleged, and should abuse be proven, then those are clearly the exceptional cases in which a court would hardly be likely to grant access.

Do we not have a principle of ensuring that someone is proven guilty before being deprived of such important rights? Amendment 130 would require that, even where there are allegations of domestic abuse, whether it is against the child or a parent, the deprivation of access to children would still hold. That clearly invites the risk of unfounded allegations being made by one parent who wishes to prevent their ex-partner seeing the children, potentially as a way in which to punish the other parent or for other reasons. That could lead to the other parent being accused, for example, of emotional or psychological abuse, for which there may be no visible signs and which, indeed, may subsequently be disproved. However, the amendment would mean that the courts would deny access to the person who is accused before any judicial opportunity to find that parent innocent.

I echo the words of my noble friend Lady Gardner of Parkes, who mentioned parental alienation, which we discussed in an earlier group, and those of the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, and others: these cases can be hugely complex. We have to trust the courts to apply the expertise necessary in such cases, which are the vast majority. The presumption of contact seems to have so much weight of evidence behind it that it would be extremely unwise and damaging to many children if the amendment, and Amendment 130A, were accepted.

We do not want the Bill to damage children in a misguided attempt to help them. It does not seem to fit with natural justice to impose automatic sanctions without the normal judicial oversight or a conviction to substantiate claims. I recognise the intention of these amendments and I share the desire to prevent any children being severely harmed or even unwittingly put into the hands of an abuser who may kill them. However, I hope that Amendments 130 and 130A will not form part of the Bill because the alternative, whereby children are denied access to their parent, and the other parent is denied access to their children, on the basis of unsubstantiated and potentially false claims, could lead to substantial harm and, indeed, the suicide of a parent or children, who often suffer terribly if they are unable to have contact with a parent.

4.45 pm

Type
Proceeding contribution
Reference
809 cc2219-2220 
Session
2019-21
Chamber / Committee
House of Lords chamber
Subjects
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