Amendment 16 would ensure that the domestic abuse commissioner is appointed full-time. Amendment 17 would include the word “independent” in the title of the domestic abuse commissioner. Clause 6 lays down that the Secretary of State must provide the commissioner with staff and other resources; Amendments 18 and 19 seek to change this, so that the commissioner would appoint staff rather than the Secretary of State.
The Government clearly saw the role of the domestic abuse commissioner as part-time, but already that role has been extended from three to four days a week because, as the Government put it in Committee in the Commons, the designate commissioner
“told us she was doing four days of work a week.”—[Official Report, Commons, Domestic Abuse Bill Committee, 9/6/20; col. 133.]
How was the earlier conclusion reached that three days would be sufficient? Was it because the designate commissioner said that it would be sufficient or because the Government said that it would be sufficient? Are the four days that now apply meant to cover only the role of the designate commissioner or are they meant to apply as well, following this Bill becoming an Act and the commissioner no longer being designate, to the role when it has the full statutory responsibilities set out in the Bill? If four days is meant to apply to the role of domestic abuse commissioner once this Bill becomes an Act, will the four days be increased to five if the commissioner says that she is doing five days of work a week? On the basis of what assessment, and by whom, of workload and responsibilities did the Government reach the conclusion that this should be a part-time rather than a full-time position? I hope the Minister can give some responses to those points.
The Bill gives the Secretary of State the power to appoint staff for the commissioner and provide the resources the commissioner needs to carry out the role. That gives the Secretary of State very real power over a commissioner who surely needs to be independent of the Secretary of State, bearing in mind that the commissioner must not feel inhibited from drawing attention, if necessary, to authorities and organisations that may be falling short in addressing domestic abuse issues, including government.
However, the Secretary of State, through the power to appoint staff and determine the resources needed by the commissioner, has a considerable oversight power over the commissioner and their effectiveness in delivering on their statutory role through the breadth and depth of work they can undertake with the resources provided. Indeed, Clause 6(1) states that the Secretary of State must provide the commissioner with the staff, accommodation, equipment and other facilities
“as the Secretary of State considers necessary for the carrying out of the Commissioner’s functions”—
not what the commissioner considers necessary, or even the view of an independent body or person, if there is a difference in view between the Secretary of State and the commissioner on this issue.
The former Independent Anti-slavery Commissioner, Kevin Hyland, told the Joint Committee that looked at the Bill that he was concerned that the Secretary of State would have too much control of the domestic abuse commissioner’s budget and the appointment of staff. He said that immediately as he took up his post, the Home Office proposed a reduction in the funds Parliament had been told he would be given. Mr Hyland described the process of appointment of staff as “unbelievable”, saying that it could take many months—up to seven, I think he said—for staff to take up their posts. I simply ask what guarantees the Government can give that the issues faced by Mr Hyland will not be repeated for the domestic abuse commissioner. I also look forward to the Government’s response to the other points that I and other noble Lords have raised during the course of this debate.
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