My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken to these amendments, particularly my noble friend Lady Altmann for her very good introduction. I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Mendelsohn, that it is not his noble friend Lord Wolfson of Tredegar responding, but I
know that he will be listening to every word I say and will correct me where I am wrong. I also thank him for some of the compelling stories that he outlined—some absolutely tragic cases which I know that all noble Lords will sympathise and empathise with. I thank all noble Lords who have engaged with me on this subject. It has been a real education for me, outlining the situations that some women find themselves in.
I will take these amendments one by one to address them properly. Amendments 3 and 5 would add a sixth limb to the list of behaviours in Clause 1(3) which count as abusive, namely the unreasonable refusal, or the threat thereof, to agree to the granting of a religious bill of divorce, or a get, which is necessary to dissolve a Jewish religious marriage. I am all too aware of the real hardship suffered by women refused a get by their husbands. As already outlined, such a woman is unable to remarry under the auspices of Orthodox Judaism. Furthermore, as a woman regarded in Jewish law as still being married, any children she goes on to have with another Jewish partner will themselves be severely restricted, as a matter of Jewish law, in who they are later able to marry. The term applied in Jewish law to such a woman, “agunah” or “chained”, is, as my noble friend Lady Altmann pointed out, both apt and tragic. I know that Jewish religious authorities are concerned about the problem, but they have not so far found a solution to it within Jewish religious law.
All too often this will be about the exertion of control by one spouse over the other, as noble Lords have pointed out. There could well be situations where the refusal of a get might constitute controlling or coercive behaviour, depending on the facts of an individual case, and this would sit better in the statutory guidance on domestic abuse provided for in Clause 73 than in the Bill.
The list of abusive behaviours in Clause 1(3) is deliberately drafted at a high level, to provide a clear and easily understandable summary of what constitutes domestic abuse. Including very specific circumstances in this list could lead to pressure to include other such circumstances, which would make the definition unwieldy. It could also create the impression that there is a hierarchy of abuse, which of course there is not. It is these more specific circumstances that the statutory guidance is designed to address, and I am more than happy to work with noble Lords to discuss what such content might look like.
Amendment 169 seeks to ensure that this guidance and the statutory guidance issued under Section 77 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 include in their discussion of controlling or coercive behaviour the unreasonable refusal to grant a get. We wish to avoid, as far as possible, prescribing in statute what statutory guidance must contain, which can arguably defeat the purpose of producing that guidance. My noble friend will be aware that, in response to significant concern from a large number of parties, Clause 73(3) does provide that guidance issued under the Bill must recognise
“that the majority of victims of domestic abuse… are female.”
However, including the specific issue of Jewish religious divorces similarly in the Bill would lead to pressure for a large number of other topics to be so included—as beautifully illustrated by my noble friend Lord Moylan—which could in practice end up reproducing much of
the substance of the guidance in the Bill. My noble friend will have just heard my commitment to referring to this subject in the guidance.
Amendment 168 seeks to amend Section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 to ensure that the person who unreasonably refuses a get, and their spouse, are regarded as being in an intimate personal relationship with each other, and therefore count as personally connected, which is a prerequisite for the application of the offence of controlling or coercive behaviour, as noble Lords have pointed out. I understand the intention behind this amendment. My noble friend may be aware that in our White Paper on domestic abuse, published in January 2019, the Government committed to undertake a review into the controlling or coercive behaviour offence. That review, which has considered evidence surrounding the effectiveness of that offence, will be published before Report, and the Government will consider their position in relation to that offence after its publication, in the light of the content of the review and any other information brought to our attention. Therefore, my noble friend’s amendment may be slightly premature.
Amendment 170 seeks to ensure that the unreasonable refusal to consent to a get be regarded as a significant factor in the consideration of whether a person has suffered domestic abuse, particularly whether the offence of controlling or coercive behaviour has been committed; whether a domestic abuse protection order should be issued; and the production by relevant local authorities of strategies for the provision of domestic abuse support, as required by Clause 55. On the first limb of that, the determination of domestic abuse, my remarks about what it is appropriate to include in the Bill and what to include in guidance apply equally.
On the two limbs which refer to court proceedings, it would not be appropriate for the Government to direct the judiciary in this way as to what it might or must consider, and nor is it necessary. The conditions which must be satisfied before a court can make a domestic abuse protection order will already enable a court to make one in relation to this behaviour, if it amounts to abusive behaviour under Clause 1(3). It is therefore unnecessary to make specific provision that a court must consider this sort of behaviour. It would also be the first provision of its type in the Bill, and lead to pressure for other considerations to be included in the Bill as factors courts must consider.
On the final limb, relating to local authorities, we are not otherwise specifying what local authorities must consider when drawing up their strategies. Strategies will relate to general provision in the local authority area, and it would be very odd for the only such provision to refer to a situation which relates to a very small number of people at most. However, again, I reassure my noble friend that this issue will be considered in the statutory guidance, to which local authorities will refer. I hope that in the light of this explanation, my noble friend is happy to withdraw her amendment.
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