UK Parliament / Open data

United Kingdom Internal Market Bill

I thank the Minister for the opportunity to discuss this matter with her. In light of what she said about wishing to set up a governance structure, I am sure that progress could be made. However, there are five short reasons why I hope the House will accept the compromise I have offered in Motion K1, which I now seek to move. First, the Commons reasons were, as has been stated by the Minister, to do with financial primacy. With the utmost respect, they are not correct. Powers to spend in devolved matters are powers of the devolved Governments, not the UK Government. Most of what is covered in this clause are matters that are devolved. Secondly, the clause therefore seeks to change the devolution settlements to enable the UK Government to override the devolution settlements. The clause is therefore a constitutional and not a financial issue.

My second reason is that, at present, funds provided by the EU for regional aid for matters within devolved powers are provided to the devolved Governments, who have to agree how the funds are to be spent. The amended clause would continue this architecture for the shared prosperity fund, the successor fund to that. Under the amendment, the UK Government would agree with the devolved Governments the way in which the funds would be spent where the funds were for matters within the devolved competences—roads, health, education and the like. This would combine the benefit of an overall strategy for the UK with the benefit of devolved Governments agreeing how funds were to be expended in the areas for which they and they alone were responsible.

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Thirdly, it would put expending the fund on a principled basis. Principles are not set out in the only description so far—that set out in box 3.1 in the Blue Book published at the time of the Autumn Statement on expenditure. The amendment would ensure a principled basis for spending on devolved areas that the UK Government and the devolved Governments could agree would be democratic and effective.

Fourthly, the effect of the clause without the amendment can be summarised as follows. It would take us back to the days of “Westminster knows best”. It would effectively be saying, “We do not trust the people of Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales to elect Governments to spend wisely in the devolved fields”. It would take powers back to London in these areas. Secondly, it would be undemocratic, because the

democratic mandate to spend in devolved fields is that of the devolved Governments and Parliaments. Thirdly, it would be inefficient, as there would be no co-ordination of spending and the real risk of inconsistent spending. In short, the clause without my amendments would enable the UK Government to spend in devolved fields and bypass the devolved Governments and Parliaments in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland who have been elected to be responsible for those fields. It would, in effect, hollow out the devolution settlements.

In contrast, the amendment would, above all, strengthen the union. Not only would it stop the hollowing out of the devolution settlement, it would show that the UK Government and the devolved Governments were acting together in a union that was working for each of the four nations and for the four nations together—the UK as a whole. For those reasons, I beg to move.

Type
Proceeding contribution
Reference
808 cc1293-4 
Session
2019-21
Chamber / Committee
House of Lords chamber
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