My Lords, I have great sympathy for the thinking that lies behind these amendments, and I have huge admiration for the unremitting way that my noble friend Lord Alton carries on his campaign to root out genocide and to bring its perpetrators to justice wherever they can be found. It is a hard struggle. The UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide now seems, with hindsight, to be a deplorably weak instrument for dealing with the challenges we face today. It was indeed the first such treaty of the modern era, as my noble friend Lady Falkner pointed out, but it is simply not up to the job.
It was conceived in the mid-1940s as a reaction against the Holocaust that the Nazis’ policy of extermination had created in Europe. It was assumed that it would be enough to require the contracting parties to enact the necessary legislation and, having done so, to require them to bring those within their jurisdiction who were charged with genocide to trial. But we can now see, in today’s world, how ineffective and perhaps naive this relatively simple convention is.
The UN convention against torture of 1987, which we became familiar with in the case of Senator Pinochet, is a much more powerful instrument. He had travelled to this country for health reasons and, no doubt to his great surprise and dismay, found himself open to proceedings brought against him under that convention in Spain. This was because he had travelled to this country, which was one of the signatory countries that was bound by the convention to extradite him to be tried there. The Law Lords in this House, of whom I was one, upheld the Spanish prosecutor’s request, although in the end Senator Pinochet was allowed to return to Chile. I mention this just to make the point that the torture convention is a much more far-reaching instrument, although even it would probably still fall short of what is needed to deal with the crime of genocide in the countries where it is now prevalent, which have been referred to this evening, simply because those countries would almost certainly refuse to release the perpetrators to a country where they could be brought to trial.
We have to make the best of what we have. We cannot go down the direct route of bringing the perpetrators to trial here, so some other route must be found. We cannot just turn our backs on this appalling crime, and we must be grateful to the noble Lord for doing his very best to see that we do not. The greatest barrier that the noble Lord, Lord Alton, has faced has been in trying to devise a mechanism for bringing the issue before our courts. We have to do this here, because there is no standing international tribunal that has universal jurisdiction in this matter.
Our courts can deal only with those over whom it has jurisdiction according to our rules, and as a general rule it can deal only with crimes committed here in this country. Parliament may give our courts extraterritorial jurisdiction over offences committed abroad, but it must do so expressly, and the accused person must be in this country when and if he is to be tried here. We have had extraterritorial jurisdiction in the case of the murder of British nationals committed abroad, since 1861; and, more recently, in the case of the taking of hostages, since 1982; torture, since 1988; and terrorism,
since 2000. But even if genocide had been on the list, without a strong UN convention that would enable us to get the people who really matter here to be tried it is almost impossible. So what else can be done?
The procedure which the noble Lord has chosen has my full support. Let me bring the bare bones that we see before us to life. There are two very important advantages, which I think are worth mentioning. First, you need to have someone with a relevant interest to bring a proceeding before the court; the person or group of persons referred to in these amendments will almost certainly satisfy that requirement. This in itself is a big step forward.
Secondly, what it provides will allow for due process in a hearing in full accordance with the rule of law. By this I mean that notice of the proceedings will be served on the Secretary of State and on a representative of the other signatory to the agreement, as they must both be given a right of reply. This is to enable the Secretary of State to appear and present such arguments as he or she thinks fit, and the other signatory, if it wishes, will have that opportunity, too. This is important, because the court will wish to test the argument in support of the application that is brought before it. There will be two questions before it: first, can the court be satisfied that the crime of genocide has been committed; and, secondly, should it grant the remedy to which the amendment refers?
I wish to stress that the procedure the noble Lord proposes is a very serious matter, not a mere formality. It will result, if it proceeds, in a fully reasoned judgment by one of our judges. That is its strength, as a finding by a judge in proceedings of this kind in the applicant’s favour will carry real weight, quite apart from the effect it will have on the relevant agreement. I think that it will achieve its object, but if a refinement in its wording is needed to be sure that it will do so, that refinement should certainly be made. I, too, very much hope that the Minister will support this amendment.