My Lords, I am very pleased to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay. On the points she made about the relationship with the devolved Administrations, when we were debating the Fisheries Bill before the summer, I was struck by how constructive the relationship with the devolved Administrations was in deciding what the fisheries regime should look like and how it should be administered. There is a good precedent there for how we should look at trade agreements, where they bear on the industry of particular parts of the United Kingdom. We will look at that more as we go through some of the other issues, but it was a very positive illustration of the Government’s willingness and ability to work with the other Administrations.
In this group, I will speak in particular on Amendment 63, which is in my name and that of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. The purpose of the amendment is to strengthen the statutory provision in the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act. Noble Lords will recall the much-referred-to 21-day period. I am a member of the EU International Agreements Sub-Committee, and nothing I say today is any criticism of the way in which Ministers have been dealing with this new committee. On the contrary, they are giving us the kind of access and information that we are looking for.
But the point is that, in addition to the 21 days, there is a period before the laying of such a treaty during which it can be looked at by the relevant committees of this House and the other place. It is a matter for Ministers how long that is. Once the document is laid, the 21-day limit applies. Amendment 63 relates to the part of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act that makes it clear that Ministers can create further periods beyond the 21 days. They can renew that period to allow for such a debate to take place in either House.
Ministers have said that, as a matter of convention, they will seek to allow such a debate wherever practical and where the parliamentary timetable allows. My point is that this should not be, in any sense, at the discretion of Ministers. Where either of the committees in the two Houses has resolved that the agreement or treaty raises issues of sufficient significance that it requires a debate in that House—in the case of either House, it might be critical of the agreement, and in the case of the other place, it could even go so far as to seek to reject its ratification—Ministers must allow such a debate to take place before ratification itself occurs.
That is what this amendment does, and I hope it is effective in that regard. It requires Ministers to continue to extend the 21-day period until such time as a debate has taken place in either House where that has been sought by the relevant committee. I hope that is reasonably straightforward.
Turning to other amendments in this group, it is rather important for us just to recall that the noble Lord, Lord Purvis—I mean no criticism of him—has retabled amendments that took the form of new clauses at Report in the House of Commons. Amendments 36, 37 and 38 bear upon the issue of a report from Ministers to highlight where there is any divergence between the continuity agreement and the originating agreement between the European Union and the relevant third country. As a former member of the EU Internal Market Sub-Committee of our EU Committee here, I know that we looked at quite a number of these continuity agreements, and the idea that they were cut and pasted is actually rather limited. Even if they were intended to be a cut-and-paste job, as with the Switzerland agreement, for example, we were reminded that they were a bit like Swiss cheese: more notable for what was left out than for what was included.
The divergence is really very important. Where the Japan agreement is concerned—and, of course, I have not seen it, but we hope to see it soon, as the Minister said on Tuesday—it is not just an enhanced agreement; we also want to see how it relates specifically to the EU-Japan agreement. For example, the EU has a most favoured nation clause built in, so is it the case that that is triggered? Will we have a most favoured nation clause as well in our agreement with Japan, so that if the European Union starts to say, “Well, if you’ve given the United Kingdom this in this regard, then we want a compensating benefit”, would that benefit also accrue to us under a most favoured nation provision?
We previously discussed the question of tariff-rate quotas, and there are significant tariff-rate quotas applicable to agricultural goods exported to Japan from the European Union. The question of how they are to be distributed is quite a significant issue. Is the Japan-UK agreement wholly additional to the EU’s existing quota, or is the EU quota being reallocated in ways that will be beneficial to the UK, or is the UK reliant, as we have probably discovered, on the rest of the European Union not using its quota in respect of some goods, in which case the UK is actually dependent on whether that quota is used by the EU? These are rather significant issues, so the point of Amendments 36 to 38 is to require Ministers to tell us about that.
Ministers can quite legitimately say, “Well, that is the job of the International Agreements Sub-Committee to go away and check.” We will do that job, but it should not be a requirement to initiate such an examination. It should be taken as read by Ministers that they should present such a report as part of the scrutiny process. I note that those new clauses at Report stage in another place were actually tabled by six Conservative Members of Parliament.
That brings me to Amendment 35 which, of course, is the same as new Clause 4, which was considered at Report stage in the Commons. I have the greatest respect and sympathy for my former parliamentary neighbour, Jonathan Djanogly from Huntingdon, who was the mover
of those amendments, but I will say two things. This particular amendment was divided upon at Report stage in the other place, and negatived with a majority of 63. That must make us consider whether, in due course, we actually want the House of Commons to think again. Are they likely to think again and why would they think again? They could change their minds because this goes to a central issue, which is the Government’s use of the prerogative power and the extent to which they are mandated and their prerogative power is circumscribed by a mandate from either House. It also means some significant constraint on their negotiating flexibility. This is different from the question of parliamentary scrutiny and the approval/ratification process. It can actually support negotiators in that they can say, as American negotiators quite often do, “That wouldn’t pass on the Hill.” They should be able to say, “That would not pass through Westminster.” It is something that we can use.
When we come to look at this again at Report, we should only send amendments back to the Commons which are asking them, in the other place, to strengthen the ratification process and the parliamentary scrutiny leading to ratification, rather than suggesting that we should create a whole new assumption that the prerogative power of the Executive must be overridden by a mandate from Parliament for all of these treaty negotiations. I hope that Ministers will say, in relation to Amendment 63, that they are prepared to see the conventional approach given statutory backing.