My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Baroness and indeed the noble Lord for the points they have made. This gives me the opportunity to set out the reasoning behind the ability of fisheries policy authorities to diverge from policies in the joint fisheries statement and from policies in the fisheries management plan, in the narrow circumstances where relevant considerations apply, and to take a different approach for stocks for which it would not be appropriate to gather data to calculate their MSY.
Starting with Amendments 59 and 63, it is clear that fisheries management plans will need to evolve over time to retain their efficacy and feasibility. While the list presented in the clause in question covers some of the major changes that we could predict might take place, other circumstances may bring to light fundamental factors to consider in updating fisheries management plans. This legislation aims to be future-proof and flexible enough to allow dynamic, evidence-based policy-making.
The premise behind this amendment is that the fisheries administrations could use this clause to somehow water down plans. However, it would also hinder their ability to strengthen plans in the light of changing circumstances. It would limit those circumstances under which fisheries administrations might consider amending, revoking or developing new fisheries management plans, or to set out a plan described in a different way from that initially proposed in a joint fisheries statement, to one or more of four exclusive reasons that we believe will severely limit their ability to react to new or emerging issues. Furthermore, preventing fisheries administrations making use of new economic, social or environmental evidence as a trigger to amend or replace fisheries management plans, and by inference informing the development of new fisheries plans, is contrary to the core principle of evidence-based policy-making.
The amendment proposed by the noble Baroness puts the threshold for using evidence at that relating only to “catastrophic events”, which would seem extremely high and to relate, one hopes, to very rare occasions. I have reflected on this and feel that it would mean that fisheries administrations would have to wait to react to events, rather than be proactive and use all new evidence potentially to head off a catastrophic event. I am concerned that the amendment creates an unacceptable risk that our fisheries administrations would be unhelpfully bound by what was foreseen as necessary at the point at which the joint fisheries statement was published, rather than having the flexibility to react to changing circumstances or moving stocks that could result in environmental, economic or social harm that was not yet catastrophic.
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I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, for his probing Amendment 60, introduced by the noble Baroness, as it gives me the opportunity to reaffirm that our international obligations are fundamentally important to the United Kingdom and will become even more crucial now that we are an independent coastal state responsible for our actions. The existing clause will ensure that fisheries management plans can evolve with our growing international ambition for the wider environment, as well as fisheries, and be a
tool to help us meet our obligations. We need to have the flexibility to make changes to accommodate new international agreements in the future. This amendment would tie us to having fisheries management plans that might be in contravention of our international obligations in the future, which I am sure is not a situation that the noble Lord or any of us would wish to end up in.
I turn to Amendment 62, which seeks clarification as to why the inclusion of the three pillars of sustainable development are a relevant circumstance to trigger changes to fisheries management plans. I have set out in some detail already the importance of being able to respond flexibly to events beyond our control, but I would like to give a little more detail. We have committed to taking an ecosystem approach to fisheries management whereby the impact on humankind, and vice versa, is a fundamental principle for consideration. Social, economic and environmental evidence is central to our implementation of a new, progressive approach to fisheries management. As I have set out, this amendment would curtail responsive, evidence-based policy-making based on using the best available scientific evidence—a commitment made through our scientific evidence objective in Clause 1.
I turn now to Amendments 72 and 73, which aim to narrow the relevant circumstances for authorities to diverge from policies set out in the fisheries management plans, joint fisheries statement and Secretary of State’s fisheries statement. As I have highlighted already, the UK Government believe that there are good reasons for retaining this degree of flexibility, while maintaining the premise, as set out in the clause, that the national fisheries authorities are required to pursue the policies outlined in the relevant fisheries statements or fisheries management plans, as applicable to them. I will not repeat all the detailed arguments made and discussed earlier, but simply note that overly restricting the circumstances in which fisheries administrations may depart from policies could inappropriately limit their ability to react to those new and emerging issues. The safeguards in Clause 10(2) set out that, if there is divergence due to a relevant change in circumstances, the relevant fisheries administration would publish a document describing the decision and the relevant change of circumstances, as well as explaining how the relevant change in circumstances affected that decision.
I have spent a little time on this and used words such as “flexibility”. This is all part of addressing our concern that we need—and our stance is—to be proactive in seeking what we all seek, which is sustainability. Although I agree that the amendments are well intentioned, they could make it more difficult to do all the things we want to do. I hope that the noble Baroness feels able to withdraw her amendment.