My Lords, in moving Amendment 20, I will speak also to Amendments 21 and 22. With these amendments we return to an issue
we discussed in Committee in a somewhat different format, but the underlying purpose this evening is the same: to increase the effectiveness and value for money of the current money laundering regime. Let me make it clear again, as I did in Committee, that this is not an attack on the utility of money laundering regulation in the fight against financial crime. However, I argue strongly that the present regime encourages mindless compliance, whereas it should be encouraging principled behaviour. As a consequence of this, the money laundering regime enjoys a very low level of public support and is too often regarded as a form-filling joke. That is a bad place for a regulatory regime to find itself. Its efficacy would be greatly improved if it were able to win over the hearts and minds of people, as opposed to earning their solemn acceptance.
Why do I think the present regime is ineffective? It is based very largely on the SAR regime—the suspicious activity report regime. Last year, just under 400,000 SARs were delivered. In the years since the present regulations were introduced in 2007, probably over 2 million SARs have been recorded. Consider the cost of their preparation and analysis. According to a freedom of information request, the outcome was that there were no convictions at all under the regulations in the first five years, from 2007 to 2012, and only four convictions and five more proceedings in the five years since. The National Crime Agency managed to recover assets totalling only £25 million last year, but claims that there are billions passing through London illegally all the time. If that represents success, I find it hard to think what failure would look like.
There is a Faustian pact between, first, the regulators, who are pressed to gather even little scraps of information, no matter how irrelevant; secondly, the compliance departments of the regulated firms, which are enjoying the opportunity for untrammelled growth in their activities and personnel; and thirdly, the professional firms that enjoy the fees earned from checking these ever-increasing compliance activities. No one ever steps back to get perspective and to see how this undoubtedly important activity could be done more effectively.
In Committee, I argued that to break into the cycle the National Crime Agency should be required to follow the principles of best regulatory practice, as laid out in Amendment 21, which we are discussing tonight. My noble friend would not, I am afraid, accept this line of argument, saying that:
“The NCA can and will act where there is criminal activity relating to money laundering. However, it does not have a regulatory remit, and to require it to have one would deflect it from its purpose of tackling serious and organised crime”.—[Official Report, 28/3/17; col. 532.]
I am not sure that I follow exactly that line of argument, but never mind—we have moved on from there. Now, we have the new body: the office for professional body anti-money laundering supervision, or OPBAS. It clearly should follow the principles of best regulatory practice. Amendment 20 requires the Government to set this body up within six months. This is an important body with an important role and therefore we need to get on with it, and to give Parliament sight of its structure and remit by means of requiring its establishment through an affirmative statutory instrument.
Amendment 22 lays down the principles that the body must follow. It must be proportionate, accountable, consistent, transparent and, most importantly, targeted at cases in which action is needed. Amendment 22 also lays down a series of processes by which the new body will ensure that the bodies it is responsible for regulating follow these principles. There is a series of ways of doing that, including publishing advice and guidance, and carrying out investigations to ensure that the operation is working effectively.
Before I conclude, to underline the seriousness of the situation we now find ourselves in, let me give the House a couple of examples of the mindlessness and the consequent drawbacks of the present regime. My most recent money laundering inquiry included a couple of dozen questions. Among them was the following: “We see you have links with a company called NS&I. Please explain these”. Since the inquirer had access to my bank account, they could see that it was an entry of £25 alongside NS&I. NS&I is, of course, National Savings & Investments. It was a premium bond winning; sadly, not £1 million, but never mind—every little helps. Does the NCA really think that the Government’s own saving authority is involved in money laundering?
A second question was: “We see that you worked in North America in the 1960s. What were your earnings?”. That was half a century ago. It is hard to think that I started money laundering the year after I left university and have so far carried on for more than 50 years, undetected. I was sufficiently irritated to answer this second question with the words, “I haven’t a clue”. Patently, that was an inadequate response, but comeback there was none. Perhaps the form was not read and just filed and the box ticked, or it was read and it was concluded that this was not an important or relevant question. Either way, it was an awful waste of the bank’s and my time. This is going on thousands and thousands of times around the country.
One can laugh about my case, but for many people triggering a money laundering inquiry catapults them into a Kafkaesque world where no one can discover who is accusing them or what they are being accused of. Since we last met in Committee, I have been sent various examples but will give only one this evening. A 43 year-old ex-soldier with a 16-year good-service record built up a capital sum of about £69,000 from his Army redundancy and other sources. On 14 February it was paid into his account at the bank where he had banked for 20 years. On 27 March, when he tried to withdraw part of the money to make his annual ISA subscription and to buy a car, he was told that the account had been frozen. Now, a month later, it still is. He has missed the opportunity to make his ISA investment because the tax year has ended. The bank will not—perhaps cannot because of the regulations—tell him what the problem is, and the Financial Ombudsman appears unable to intervene. He is also concerned that this incident will damage his future credit rating and he will have no way of obtaining redress. So there are very serious cases where this money laundering regime is not working effectively to catch the individuals it should really be aiming at.
In Committee, I referred to the increasing prevalence of de-risking by regulated entities. Under pressure from the money laundering authorities, they close
down whole categories of accounts irrespective of their behaviour and performance because they might be risky from a money laundering point of view. I referred to a long-standing friend of mine who lives in Pakistan—a British citizen—who has had his account unilaterally closed. Since Committee, I have heard more examples of smaller charities about how they are finding it difficult to operate overseas because of money laundering regulations. Most recently, the Gurkha Welfare Trust is having difficulty obtaining banking facilities to transmit money to ex-Gurkha soldiers living in Nepal who have fallen on hard times. They live in Nepal and that is a red flag.
In the event that my noble friend cannot accept my amendments, although I am sure she is going to—