My Lords, I spent quite a lot of time reading the amendment and trying to understand it. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for explaining it to us. As I understand it, the clause does not require relevant bodies to put these procedures in place; it just mandates the Chancellor to produce some presumably helpful guidelines, which the amendment would then require those relevant bodies to adopt. I think that is the gist of it.
If the amendment is prompted by concerns raised about the guidance the Chancellor will have to offer as a result of the clause, I hope the Minister might consider returning to that issue at subsequent readings as no explanation is given in the clause as to what the guidance will be. It would be very helpful for corporations affected to understand how they can rely on the defence of “reasonable prevention procedures”, so that they can put in place an appropriate strategy to ensure compliance with their new obligations if those are put on them through this amendment, or possibly—as is perhaps my great concern—at a later stage in the Bill or by statutory instrument.
It must be sensible to allow corporations to build on their current policies and procedures already in place under other legislative requirements to show that they have a defence to this offence. If not, the compliance costs would be significant. Even where current policies are acceptable there will still be costs involved in training staff, certification and reporting processes. There is, therefore, clearly a need to ensure that the measures can be implemented in a way that mitigates additional costs as far as possible.
Guidance can help corporations to identify how they can demonstrate that they have followed satisfactory due diligence procedures and have a “reasonable care” defence in the event that one of their associates is discovered to have criminally facilitated tax evasion. However, it must be recognised that every business is different. The importance of the guidance will be enhanced if the legislation explicitly states that the
courts should “have regard to” it. This would provide a valuable extra—although not absolute—safeguard for corporations that have relied on the guidance when implementing their procedures, although, of course, it cannot be a safe harbour.
In short, the amendment will be onerous to apply to every relevant body. I therefore speak against it.