Amendment 81 extends the debate we had immediately before the break with regard to the assets that may be liable to forfeiture. I understand the extension in Clause 13, which we have discussed, but I wonder why there should be any limits on what falls within the forfeiture provisions, because life changes. Items that come into common use change. Who had heard of bitcoins 10 years ago? That is the thinking behind my Amendment 81, which would extend cash, and Amendment 84, which would extend listed assets. The Minister in the Public Bill Committee in the Commons said of what is now Clause 14 that the Government did not want to use the power in new Section 303B(2) “indiscriminately”. I am puzzled what that term means. I can see that they would want to be careful about that use, but I do not see the relevance of discrimination.
In her letter of 17 March to noble Lords following Second Reading, the Minister referred to a balanced approach and said that allowing seizure of any type of property would not be proportionate. Again, that term puzzles me. Balance and proportion are relevant to the circumstances in which property can be forfeited—the conditions which have to be met, and so on—but are they relevant to the type of asset? We are in danger of allowing the owner of an asset to apply criminal ingenuity to remain a step ahead, finding new categories of property in which the proceeds of crime can be held. At Second Reading, the Minister said:
“As criminals adapt, so must we”.—[Official Report, 9/3/17; col. 1476.]
We should—but it would be even better if we were to anticipate and be a step ahead, not a step behind, because it is very hard to be in step precisely.
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Those are the most significant comments that I want to make on the group of amendments, but I have quite a number of others. I have expressed quite a hard line but, swinging the pendulum back a little, I want to probe the criteria for sizable assets and to ask what the legislation intends by including in three places that there should be “reasonable grounds” for suspecting that property is intended for unlawful use, not simply that it is intended for unlawful use, and also to probe how property intended for unlawful use or use in unlawful conduct is assessed. Is it something less than a firm plan? Does it mean that the intention must be proved, or is it in the eye of the beholder? That is why “reasonable grounds” for suspicion are within my amendments.
Amendment 86 takes us to codes of practice. New Section 303G refers to the Secretary of State proposing,
“to issue a code of practice”,
but the code is not optional, so why does the Bill say:
“Where the Secretary of State proposes to issue a code of practice”?
Does where mean when, or—I am not trying to be clever about this—are there other codes of practice that may be applied?
Amendment 87 is about the retention and storage of property while proceedings take their course. The Bill requires property seized to be “safely stored”, but I am looking for an assurance that the conditions of
storage will be appropriate. Artistic works, stamps and I dare say other assets may require a certain temperature or humidity if they are not to deteriorate. So my probe is as to whether safe storage just means that they go into a cardboard box on a shelf or whether it means something more sophisticated than that.
Amendment 102 probes why it is necessary for someone who applies to have property released to him to demonstrate that he was deprived of it by unlawful conduct. What if it was the subject of a loan, or if there was an error?
Amendment 103 is about compensation, which under the Bill will be payable only if the circumstances are exceptional. Can the Minister explain why—and is that fair? It must mean that generally, when property is seized but has to be returned, there is no compensation for loss. I stress that compensation would be payable, leaving aside the exceptional circumstances, only for loss—it is not compensation, period. So why is it only in exceptional circumstances?
The Secretary of State can amend the regulations about the source of compensation. Amendment 104 would provide that the Secretary of State cannot amend the actual payment. I think that that is what the clause means, but I would be glad of assurance. Amendment 105 goes back to a point I raised on an earlier provision: exclusion from freezing for living expenses should, in my view, extend to the living expenses of dependants. I beg to move.