My Lords, I am obliged to noble Lords. As the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, observed, there have been quite a lot of external communications on this. Indeed, I notice that the quotation that the noble Lord, Lord Foster, gave on my observations in Committee was identical to that quoted in a letter from Towerhouse LLP to the Department for Culture, Media and Sport on 17 March. Everybody seems to be singing from the same hymn book.
At present, Section 195 of the Communications Act 2003 requires that appeals against Ofcom’s regulatory
decisions are decided by the Competition Appeal Tribunal on the merits. I shall come back to “on the merits” in more detail in a moment.
Appellants argue that appeals “on the merits” should allow for a bottom-up review of the decision, inviting the tribunal to substitute its own view for that of the regulator—in effect, two tiers doing the same thing. Appeals are therefore seen as an opportunity to rerun arguments that were considered and rejected by Ofcom in reaching its decision, or to put forward swathes of new evidence to persuade the tribunal to reach a different decision. Such appeals can lead to extremely lengthy and costly litigation, with extensive cross-examination of experts and witnesses. This depletes the regulator’s resources and means that other regulatory action by Ofcom is inevitably delayed, allowing for the potential for providers to frustrate the regulator with speculative or even spurious appeals, causing considerable uncertainty in the market and delay to other regulatory decisions.
The Government consider that appeals in the communications sector need to be rebalanced to ensure that Ofcom is held properly to account for its decisions, but also enabled to regulate in an effective and timely manner in the interests of citizens and consumers, as it is required to do. Clause 80 does just that; it requires that instead of merits appeals, the tribunal must decide appeals against Ofcom’s decisions by applying the same principles as would be applied by a court on a judicial review. Judicial review is generally a well-understood standard of review against which very significant decisions made by most public bodies are tested. Importantly, this will ensure that appeals are focused on identifying errors in Ofcom’s decisions, rather than simply seeking to persuade the tribunal to reach a different conclusion.
Those affected by Ofcom’s decisions will remain able to challenge them effectively. In Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, said that judicial review was,
“solely concerned with whether the decision is unlawful in a technical sense—that is, was the correct process followed?”.—[Official Report, 8/2/17; col. 1734.]
I hope I can reassure him that this is simply not the case. First, appellants are able to argue that Ofcom’s decisions are based on material errors of fact or law. Material errors will therefore be identified and corrected in a judicial review process. Secondly, judicial review is a flexible standard of review, which allows the court to decide on the appropriate intensity of review according to the individual circumstances of the case. For example, there may be more intensive review processes in the context of matters pertaining to human rights. In particular, Ofcom has various statutory duties to ensure that its decisions are proportionate—in other words, that they go no further than is appropriate and necessary to attain a legitimate aim. In reviewing whether a decision is proportionate, the courts can carry out a closer and more rigorous review of the decision.
Of course, appeals in the communications sector are required to ensure that,
“the merits of the case are duly taken into account”,
as a matter of EU law under Article 4 of the EU framework directive. That will remain the case under a judicial review standard. I understand that there is uncertainty about the extent to which requirements in EU law may become a part of UK law after the United Kingdom leaves the EU, but that will be a matter for Parliament to determine when the great repeal Bill is introduced, as the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, observed, and will be looked at in the context of the overall future regulatory framework for electronic communications, including the appeals regime, once the UK has left the EU.
A number of Ofcom’s regulatory decisions are already appealable only by way of judicial review, and the Court of Appeal confirmed as long ago as 2008 that judicial review is capable of taking account of the merits of the case, as required by EU law and, in particular, by Article 4 of the EU directive. Lord Justice Jacob in the Court of Appeal in the T-Mobile case in 2008 said that it,
“is inconceivable that Art. 4 in requiring an appeal which can duly take into account the merits, requires Member States to have in effect a fully equipped duplicate regulatory body waiting in the wings just for appeals. What is called for is an appeal body and no more, a body which can look into whether the regulator had got something material wrong”.
He also held that,
“there can be no doubt that just as JR was adapted because the Human Rights Act so required, so it can and must be adapted to comply with EU law and in particular Article 4 of the Directive”.
Indeed, in a more recent case involving judicial review and Article 4 in 2016, Mr Justice Cranston observed that, as the Competition Appeal Tribunal had said:
“Ofcom enjoys a margin of appreciation on issues which entail the exercise of its judgment”,
and that,
“the Tribunal should apply appropriate restraint”.
It is not a second-tier regulator, and the fact that it might have preferred to give different weight to various factors in the exercise of a regulatory judgment would not in itself provide a sufficient basis to set aside Ofcom’s determination. It should not interfere with Ofcom’s exercise of a judgment unless satisfied that it was wrong.
These are the relevant judicial review standards that will be applied in these circumstances. We do not want a complete retrial—if I can call it that—or a situation in which, at two levels, we begin at the beginning and end at the end with an entirely different opinion and approach to the evidence, and, perhaps, entirely new arguments being advanced evidentially in support of the merits of a case. That is a never-ending process and is not common to any other area of regulation by a public authority.
The judgments I have referred to have been considered in a number of subsequent cases and it is clear that a judicial review standard is consistent with the requirements of Article 4 of the framework directive. In these circumstances, it is not considered that there is any real need for this amendment. It is appropriate that we proceed with Clause 80 and I therefore invite the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.