My Lords, it is a delight to follow my noble friend Lord Rowlands, whom I first met as an extremely enthusiastic Welsh Office Housing Minister in 1974. He is as enthusiastic as ever, and his enthusiasm for devolution and for protecting and developing it and everything to do with Welsh administration has not waned since that time.
As is often the case with our parliamentary Bills, the description of Clause 55 and Part 4 as “consequential provision” is totally inappropriate. I shall mainly address the amendments in my name in the group. Whenever I see the name of the Secretary of State for Wales—the name of the office, I should say, because there are distinguished former Secretaries of State present—referred to in devolution legislation, as a former Presiding Officer, I always ask why. I particularly ask why here for the reasons already set out and on the basis of the evidence given not just to committees of this House—we have heard about the Constitution Committee report—but to the Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee of the Assembly. As I announced in the previous debate, I am now returned to that committee, although with a different affiliation.
As we know, it is the responsibility of such committees to look at legislative proposals from a constitutional point of view and assess their validity and constitutional
propriety. The discussions of the National Assembly committee included one with the erudite and experienced Constitution Committee of this House. I was delighted that we met together, because it confirmed everything we had thought for ourselves. Therefore, we have the full support and authority of this House in what we are saying, and the authority of the distinguished lawyers I have cited before and will no doubt cite again when we debate these issues.
Professor Thomas Glyn Watkin, in evidence to the Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee of the National Assembly on 22 June this year, emphasised that he was just as concerned about the provisions that now appear in Clause 53 as he was when they first appeared in the draft Bill; they have continued or been revived in the current Bill. It is a basic constitutional principle that a United Kingdom Secretary of State should not change legislation made by the elected Assembly of Wales. I would argue that Clause 2 is contrary to that principle. To go back to a discussion that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and I had in a previous sitting in Committee, how can we state that normally, Parliament will not legislate on behalf of the Assembly on matters which are in the competence of the Assembly, and yet give powers to a Secretary of State to change legislation?
Professor Thomas Watkin’s view is very clear: any power which changes the law of the Assembly should be exercised in the Assembly. It is the Assembly that should be able to say whether it is acceptable to change the law. He goes further: he says that the approach in the clause,
“highlights the fact that the powers of Westminster—even in devolved areas—are still superior in terms of their voice”.
That was said by a senior legal academic in Wales, and those views are shared by Professor Rick Rawlings. There should be further amendment to this clause, as I seek in the amendments in my name, to ensure that the consent of the National Assembly is always required when such a power is exercised. These amendments have the support, as I indicated, of the Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee; the imprimatur, if I may so describe it, of the Llywydd, the Presiding Officer; and the advice of the Assembly legal services.
We have to emphasise that in this House we are dealing with absolutely clear constitutional principles. Regulations that seek to change the law but which apply only in Wales and are made by the National Assembly must always be approved by the National Assembly. That is a simple case of constitutional propriety, as has been argued so eloquently already by my noble friend Lord Rowlands. I would regard any attempt by another legislature to change National Assembly law without consent as constitutionally unsound. As I have already said, it goes against the principles of Clause 2.
I know what the Minister will say because we have discussed these matters. He will not accept my amendments, but I ask him to consider whether it is appropriate sometimes that he should apply his well-known constitutional skills and excellence as an academic lawyer to his practice of politics—even in this House—as he used to apply them so effectively when we both developed devolution in those early days together.
I know that this is an unfair argument. It is an argumentum ad hominem, which is inappropriate, but I plead with him, even at this stage of our discussions, and certainly between now and Report, to reconsider. I will not say to him what I said once to a senior politician in Wales—“Go and pray”—but I ask him to pray in aid all the legal advice that we have given him in this House.
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