My Lords, as the noble Lord explained, Amendment 191 would insert a new clause that would see subjects of the lawful and proper use of investigatory powers notified of that fact.
There are a number of problems with that proposition, both in principle and from a practical perspective. First, let me be clear that I agree with the principle that where a serious error has occurred in the use of the investigatory powers, the commissioner should be able to inform a person affected. Clause 198(1) makes this absolutely clear.
However, I do not agree with the principle that, as a matter of course, anyone subject to the lawful use of an investigatory power must be notified, unless it would damage an ongoing serious crime or national security investigation. A principle of that kind would mean, for example, that we would need to notify suspected criminals and terrorists that they have been under investigation just because a specific ongoing investigation had stalled or, indeed, had concluded with evidence of wrongdoing but with insufficient evidence to bring a prosecution.
As noble Lords will know, suspected criminals and terrorists will often appear on the radar of the police and the security services at different times in the context of different investigations. It would clearly not be appropriate to inform them that investigatory powers had been used against them in a particular case as this could prompt them to change how they behave or communicate, which could hamper a future investigation. This is particularly important in relation to national security because this amendment would require the commissioner to make the subject of interest aware of,
“the conduct that has taken place’.
That would not just run contrary to the long-standing policy of successive Governments of neither confirming nor denying any specific activity by the security and intelligence agencies, but would essentially require the techniques the agencies use in specific cases to be made public. That would clearly assist terrorists in their operations, allowing them to stay one step ahead of the agencies.
Beyond the principled objections to this amendment, there would be numerous practical problems. It would not be practical, for example, for the commissioner to make everyone whose data were subject to a data retention notice aware of that fact. For example, he would have to require the relevant telecommunications operator to provide him with a list of all relevant customers, and it would have to inform him every time a new customer joined its service. It would not be difficult for criminals to use that process to identify services that they could use to avoid detection.
Equally, I suggest to the noble Lord that it would put unreasonable burdens on all public authorities covered by this Bill to require them constantly to need to make a case to the commissioner as to whether it would hamper national security or serious crime investigations if subjects were told that investigatory powers had been used against them. It would surely be better for the police to spend time and money on investigating criminals, rather than on determining whether individuals should be informed about perfectly lawful investigative activity.
Furthermore, in the context of bulk warrants under parts 6 and 7, the public authority or commissioner would need to examine all the data collected under the
warrant to identify the individuals whose data have been collected. That would not only be impractical, but data would be looked at that otherwise there would have been no need to examine. This new clause would therefore actually lead to greater intrusions into privacy than would otherwise be necessary, which I am sure cannot be the intention.
I submit to the noble Lord that the proposed amendment is at best unnecessary and at worst threatens fatally to undermine the work of law enforcement and the security and intelligence agencies.
Let us be clear what the effect would be. It is not innocent, ordinary, law-abiding people who would be notified, because the agencies do not seek or obtain warrants against such people; it is suspected criminals and terrorist suspects. They would then change their behaviour, and we would have less chance of bringing them to justice. That point lies at the nub of the argument I have put to the noble Lord. I am sure that cannot be his intention, so I hope he will consider it the right thing to do to reflect on this point between now and Report, and withdraw the amendment at this stage.
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