No, I do not believe it does. A lot of these overheads, such as those relating to back-office functions, can be shared with other arms of the executive, so my advice is that these would be extra costs that would have to be paid for by the new body.
The new commission will also have to appoint a board and at least three non-executive directors. That would certainly add significantly to the expense of creating a new oversight body with, I contend, very little benefit in the quality of the oversight that it provides. Creating a commission would not serve to advance independence, which was one argument put forward by the noble Baroness. The current oversight bodies, the Intelligence Services Commissioner, the Interception of Communications Commissioner and the Chief Surveillance Commissioner, are provided for in statute in the same way as we propose to provide for the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. The model we propose will allow the oversight bodies to focus on their core tasks of inspections and investigations without tying them up in too much administration; that is a sensible approach. I hope that the noble Baroness will feel able to reflect on that between now and Report.
As for the comment that the model we propose does not respond to the recommendations about separating powers, it will be for the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to decide how to arrange and run their office. The commissioner will have responsibility for two distinct functions and will have sufficient staff to undertake them independently of each other. However, as David Anderson recognised, there are distinct advantages in having that relationship, even if it is an arm’s-length one, between the two functions. An example of where David Anderson felt that the relationship will be useful is when the judicial commissioners could specifically advise the inspectorate on matters to look out for on their inspections. The dialogue would be lost if the two functions were kept completely distinct.