My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, explained, these amendments seek to provide that certain authorisations can be given only where there is a reasonable suspicion that a serious criminal offence has been, or is likely to be, committed. It is almost like trying to compare apples and oranges. The construct of the Bill is not around reasonable suspicion. It is around necessity and proportionality. They achieve the same goal, but in different ways. These amendments are not necessary and, in the case of communications data, would undermine the ability of law enforcement and other public authorities to catch criminals and to keep the public safe. First, let me assure the Committee that for a warrant to be issued for the prevention or detection of serious crime, a sufficiently compelling case will always be required; a speculative warrant could never be approved under Clause 20. The same is true for authorisations to obtain communications data for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime. So these amendments respond to a concern that, I suggest, is misplaced.
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In relation to the retention of communications data, the effect of these amendments would be even more profound. By requiring that data can be retained—that is, held by a communications service provider—only
where it is suspected that a crime has been committed, the amendment proposes to move the UK from a data retention regime to one of data preservation. Data preservation means that data are retained by a communications service provider only once a suspect becomes known to the police. In many cases, that is simply too late to be of use; for example, 58% of requests for communications data in child abuse investigations are for data that are more than six months old. Under a data preservation model, those data may not be available, and criminals would walk free.
It is for that reason that the UK operates a data retention model, rather than a data preservation model, whereby data are retained by companies and accessed by law enforcement only when it is necessary and proportionate to do so—the relevant test under the Bill. The benefits of such a model over data preservation are stark. In a Europe-wide investigation into online child sexual exploitation, of 371 suspects identified in the UK, 121 arrests or convictions were possible; of 377 suspects in Germany, which does not have data retention, no arrests were made.
In view of the very significant impact that would flow from these amendments, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw Amendment 37.