My Lords, I too thank the noble Earl, Lord Howe, for repeating the Statement this afternoon, and I too begin by paying tribute to all the service personnel and civilian staff who served bravely and with distinction in Iraq and to their families. I do so particularly in remembrance of all those who lost their lives, and I also remember the countless thousands of Iraqi citizens who died in the conflict. Indeed, today we have heard that the number of people killed in a suicide attack in Baghdad at the weekend has risen to 250. That is the latest in a much-too-long list of terrorist outrages in Istanbul, Paris, Brussels and—11 years ago tomorrow—London.
Today we have seen the judgment of Charles Kennedy to lead my party in opposition to the war in Iraq, back in 2003, as truly vindicated. His words at the time, in a debate in the House of Commons, were profoundly and devastatingly prophetic. He said:
“Although I have never been persuaded of a causal link between the Iraqi regime, al-Qaeda and 11 September, I believe that the impact of war in these circumstances is bound to weaken the international coalition against terrorism itself, and not least in the Muslim world. The big fear that many of us have is that the action will simply breed further generations of suicide bombers”.—[Official Report, Commons, 18/3/03; col. 786.]
The Chilcot report sets out clearly that the United Kingdom chose to join the invasion of Iraq before the peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted. Military action was therefore not a last resort. The inquiry concludes that the judgments made about Iraq’s capabilities were not justified and that the Joint Intelligence Committee should have made it clear that the assessed intelligence had not been established beyond doubt either that Iraq had continued to produce chemical and biological weapons or that efforts to develop nuclear weapons continued.
However, there can be no satisfaction in saying that we got it right at the time. Instead of improving our security, the war that ensued in Iraq has, sadly, made our country and our world less safe. The choices made by those at the time to go to war have contributed to a failed state that continues to be a source of extremism and instability across the Middle East. The decision to lead UK forces into the invasion and the occupation of Iraq in 2003 not only meant that we took our eye off the ball in Afghanistan at a crucial time in our
military engagement there but directly contributed to the continued instability in the Middle East and the threats that the world now faces from Daesh.
Of course the terrorists themselves are responsible for these horrific attacks, but the actions of a Government were responsible for helping to create the vacuum in which terrorism was allowed to develop—actions taken despite being advised by the Joint Intelligence Committee that such a development was a risk. Its assessment on 10 February 2003 concluded that,
“al-Qaida and associated groups will continue to represent by far the greatest terrorist threat to Western interests, and that threat will be heightened by military action against Iraq”.
Perhaps one of the more devastating and shaming findings of the report is that the United Kingdom failed to plan or prepare for the major reconstruction programme required in Iraq. That, together with the exaggeration of the threat posed by the Iraqi regime to the public to justify this war, has damaged public trust. It has damaged our country’s standing in the world and has almost certainly undermined the ability of the United Kingdom to intervene abroad to prevent crimes against humanity. A further consequence has been hundreds of thousands of Iraqis fleeing their country as refugees, in turn resulting in millions of Iraqi children missing out on education, which has resulted in yet another generation of young people growing up without hope for the future.
It is easy for us all to agree that lessons must be learned, so what do the present Government consider to be the most important lessons that can be learned from this report? How have the Government addressed the issue of legal advice in such situations so that never again can it be said that the circumstances in which it was ultimately decided that there was a legal basis for the action taken were “far from satisfactory”? Will the noble Earl reflect on the governance issues—on the one hand, so-called sofa government and the inadequacies of that, but also the difficulties and dangers that we have if we have an ineffective Opposition unwilling to challenge and scrutinise?
Does he agree that we must reaffirm this country’s commitment to the international rule of law, and to collective decision-making through the institutions of the United Nations? Does he agree that before we would ever commit to further armed interventions in the future, it is vital that we have a post-conflict reconstruction plan, as well as an exit plan? Finally, does he share my concern over findings such as that at key times,
“UK forces in Iraq faced gaps in some key capability areas”?
Has any assessment been made of the extent to which such gaps could have contributed to casualties? Can he reassure the House that in future there will be transparency on the preparedness of our troops to be deployed for war, and the adequacy of the equipment and logistical support that they are fully entitled to expect?