There are a number of amendments here and I will try to deal with them in turn and answer the questions that have been raised. The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, questioned whether a court should be able to order the destruction of an article bearing the cultural emblem unless it had been given permission by an expert. It is probably worth saying that the circumstances for destruction that I think this is intended to address is where the emblem is on items such as cards or T-shirts—it is not about
destroying original cultural property. I agree that the court should not, in any event, order the destruction of articles unless it is clear that it is necessary and appropriate to do so. The current drafting only permits the court to make such an order as appears to it to be necessary.
We do not feel that it would be appropriate for expert evidence to give permission to the court to order the destruction of an article as that would mean that expert opinion would be allowed to override the views of the court. Of course, it is for the court to determine what to do with an article which is subject to forfeiture on the basis of relevant factors and evidence, which would include consideration of what was involved. That could, of course, include expert evidence but it would be for the court to decide that. I do not believe that the court would order the destruction of any article unless it was sure that it was necessary, but we believe that it is right for the court to have this option if it is the most appropriate means of upholding the authority of the cultural emblem, thus ensuring compliance with the convention. That is the background to that provision.
It has been suggested that a court could vary an order for forfeiture of cultural property in connection with a dealing offence only where it is a response to new evidence—this relates to Amendment 19. The potential reasons for a court varying provision under this section are not necessarily related to new evidence, so it would be inappropriate to limit the court’s discretion in this way. For example, the court may have made provision for the forfeited property to be retained at a specific site which was subsequently deemed to be no longer suitable for storage of that property.
On Amendment 22, which deals with compensation, it is of course right that those who, through no fault of their own, find themselves in possession of unlawfully exported cultural property should be compensated if the court orders their property to be forfeited so that it can be returned to its rightful owner. Paragraph 4 of the first protocol requires compensation to be paid by the state party whose obligation it was to prevent the unlawful export of cultural property from territory occupied by it. Which state that is will depend on the facts of each case. There is no obligation under the convention for anyone else to pay compensation, although in certain cases someone else may do so; for example, to ensure that the cultural property concerned can be forfeited before the forfeiture order lapses.
Ensuring that compensation is paid may require sensitive and potentially time-consuming negotiations between the United Kingdom and the occupying state. It would not be appropriate for the court to state who is responsible for the costs of compensation while negotiations are in progress. Indeed, that could put the success of those negotiations at risk. There is also a risk that forfeiture proceedings would become unnecessarily complicated and drawn out by arguments over who is responsible for paying compensation, with those states potentially responsible becoming involved in the proceedings. The noble Lord’s amendment risks complicating both the court proceedings and efforts to ensure that the occupying state pays the compensation that is due.
On Amendment 23, the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, raised the issue of police resourcing and the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, raised the question of storage. We would be happy to have discussions with the British Museum on this, but we do not expect the number of objects falling within the scope of the Bill to be an enormous burden for museums. However, the noble Lord has raised the point and I will consult them. I am already writing on the general issue of resourcing in relation to the Armed Forces and the police, so I will make sure that we cover the necessary ground.
On Amendment 23 and the requirement for the court to,
“make public the location and conditions of … storage”,
of cultural property, I agree that information about where an item of cultural property should be stored, and the conditions under which it is to be kept, should generally be available to the public. A court order is of course a matter of public record, and can normally be obtained by members of the public upon request, so there is no need for a separate provision allowing the court to make public any particular aspects. I should add that in some circumstances it may be necessary for a court to order that the location be kept secret if, for example, the cultural property in question is under particular threat. The general power contained in Clause 22(1) would enable a court to make such an order. We are satisfied that the current drafting of these provisions gives the appropriate courts full flexibility to make appropriate provisions and orders and to take account of the relevant circumstances. I hope that in those circumstances the noble Lord feels able to withdraw the amendment.