My Lords, I regret that I was unable to participate at Second Reading—the aeroplane I was in did not land until mid-afternoon—but I hope I may join in the proceedings today on this very important measure. I add my welcome and thanks to the Minister for introducing this Bill in your Lordships’ House.
I fully sympathise with the desire of my noble friend to ensure that the provisions that we legislate are up to date and that the definition of culture is as contemporary as it can be and is, as far as possible, future-proof. However, does he feel that the term “movable property” may, with sufficient ingenuity and latitude taken by the courts, satisfy what he seeks to achieve? The subsequent list of examples given in the definition in Article 1 of the convention, to which he referred, is illustrative only. It does, of course, reflect conceptions of culture that were prevalent at that date. However, I am concerned and would be grateful if my noble friend would explain how he deals with the very practical legal objection that has been put forward by Professor Roger O’Keefe, who warns us that it is dangerous to mess about—not his words but mine—with the definition or its interpretation. He says:
“The definition is found in a treaty to which 127 states are currently parties. International law dictates that the definition be the same and be interpreted the same way by all states parties”.
He is concerned that, if we now attempt to alter a definition that has been acceded to by 127 other states parties, difficulties may arise. Among those, he suggests that there could be,
“knock-on effects under international law. Not the least of these would be that the UK would be asserting forms of extraterritorial jurisdiction”,
with all the sensitivities that go with that.
While I fully sympathise with the objective of my noble friend, it would help the Committee if he would explain how he would deal with that technical, but very important, objection that we have been advised of.