The noble Baroness asked about communication of out-of-country appeals procedures. I do not have that information immediately to hand. I am aware of the tribunal regulations. Perhaps I could undertake to write to her to outline what the guidance is.
My research has come to a conclusion already. There is published guidance on the GOV.UK website on how to appeal from overseas, so it is there. I knew that it existed but I was not aware that it was actually on the website. Whether further steps are taken with regard to this matter, I cannot say. If in fact there is something over and above the website, I will write to advise the noble Baroness.
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Perhaps I may come on to the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham. He observed that the vast majority of migrants in these cases are legally here in the United Kingdom. With great respect, that is not so. We are not dealing with asylum seekers, we
are dealing only with migrants who have been found to have no right to be in the United Kingdom. It is an appeals process following that determination that we are addressing in Clause 34, so it is not a case of saying to legal migrants that they have to leave the country for some appellate process; with respect, that is simply not the case at all. I cannot accept that the out-of-country appeal process is contrary to the rule of law. Indeed, the Court of Appeal went out of its way to point out that an out-of-country appeal process is perfectly legitimate. It falls within the rule of law and provides what is required under the convention processes; namely, a procedure that meets the central requirements of effectiveness and fairness.
As regards the percentage of appeals allowed in general, I am not able to give a figure, and in respect of appeals that fall under the existing conditions, there are not sufficient data since the Immigration Act 2014 to give percentage figures for out-of-country appeals. But there is a parallel in the context of refusal-of-entry appeals, where, as I noted earlier, some 38% of such appeals succeed: I acknowledge that. Again, I take issue with the suggestion that there is going to be some avalanche of compensation. There might be an avalanche of compensation claims, as there sometimes is in such circumstances, but in my submission they will be ill founded and therefore it is not an issue. The fact that an appeal succeeds does not confer upon somebody a right to compensation. That is taking even our compensation culture a little too far.
With regard to the matter of children, I reiterate that the best interests of the child are a primary consideration and will remain so in terms of Clause 34. We are entitled to have some confidence in the decision-making process which is conferred upon the Secretary of State for the Home Department in this context. The noble Baroness, Lady Sheehan, referred to a particular case involving someone from Chad and she observed that the Home Office does get it wrong. I am not standing here to make a claim of infallibility—indeed, I believe that the right reverend Prelate might intervene if I attempted it—but nevertheless while the Home Office is not infallible, it is responsible. The department proceeds responsibly in applying these powers and procedures. I note again that from my own experience of reading the decision-making letters in the context of the Byndloss and Kiarie cases, they reflect a very detailed assessment, particularly in cases that involve the interests of a child.
I mentioned earlier the matter of the time taken on appeals—a point raised by my noble friend Lord Horam. As I say, it is acknowledged that in the past there were backlogs. The intention is that there should be further improvement in the time taken for appeals, and it is hoped that the further provisions in the Bill will lead to a situation in which the appeal process for those involved in simple cases will be up to a limit of six months, and even in complex cases up to a limit of 12 months.
The noble Earl, Lord Sandwich, referred to Section 9 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 and gave some comparative figures. I am not in a position to respond immediately to those figures, so perhaps he would be prepared to let me write to him on that subject.
There is one further point, which was made by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. He alluded to Section 55 and to the interests of the child, and suggested that perhaps, although these obligations exist, it might be better if they were reflected in the clause itself. That is a point on which I should like to reflect before Report, if he will permit me to do so. I am obliged to noble Lords.