I quite understand the noble Lord’s point. That is why the Secretary of State retains discretion over certification—this is not an absolute. In circumstances where there is a risk of serious irreversible harm because of conditions in a particular country or part of a country, there will not be certification. In circumstances where that would amount to a breach of an individual’s human rights, there will not be certification. There is that safety net. It may not be as large as some noble Lords would wish but it is there for these very cases. It is not dissimilar from the instance cited by the right reverend Prelate of a child being exposed to the very real risk of sexual violence or mutilation. Again, this is why the provisions of Clause 34 are not absolute and compel the Home Secretary to take a reasoned decision that has regard to a primary issue being the interests of the child.
A further point was raised by the noble Lord about whether and when the Secretary of State for the Home Department could be sure that she had all the information. Of course, there can be no absolutes. However, in a situation involving children, individuals—parents and
carers—readily come forward to explain that there are children. Where the existence of children is identified, that matter is explored, as it is bound to be, pursuant to Section 55 of the Act I cited earlier.
My experience of being involved in the Kiarie and Byndloss cases before the Court of Appeal involved my examining the decision letters issued by the Home Office. These are not glib, one-paragraph notices, but very detailed and considered letters that were sent out, giving not only a decision but a reasoned foundation for that decision. I cannot—and would never dare to—assert that they are invariably right in every respect, or that they are exhaustive in every way. On the face of it, however, it is the practice, subject to the guidance given, to send out truly reasoned decision letters in these circumstances, with particular reference to the interests of the child or children who may be affected.
I turn to the observations of the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, who also mentioned the Kiarie and Byndloss cases. She suggested that ILPA took a slightly different view of that decision from the one I have expressed. I would cleave, however, to the ratio of the unanimous decision of the Bench of the Court of Appeal: it is quite clear what it was saying with regard to this matter. It is not tied to the fact of criminality; it is tied to the facility for an out-of-country appeal and the ability for that appeal to be discharged in such a way that we can be satisfied that it is fair to the appellant. In other words, it may not be the most advantageous form of appeal but it does meet the essential requirements of effectiveness and fairness. That is not affected in one way or another by the pre-existing criminality, or alleged criminality, of the relevant appellant. To that extent, I am afraid I have to differ from her on that matter.
The noble Baroness mentioned the matter of a family test. However, a family test does not immediately arise in this context. I understand that the family test is designed to ensure that the Government’s policies overall encourage and support family life in the United Kingdom. We are dealing here with someone who is not entitled to be in the United Kingdom, and the policies that concern removing persons from the United Kingdom will therefore not always engage the family test.