It is set down in detail, but in general it means that someone is not stripped. It means that articles of clothing are removed and returned in turn, but without them being stripped.
I return to Amendment 185, which would limit the Secretary of State’s ability to direct officers to search for nationality documents to those in respect of whom she has made a deportation order under Section 5(1) of the Immigration Act 1971, preventing its use for those whom she intends to deport. It may help if I explain that the Secretary of State, in accordance with regulations made under Section 105 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, issues a written notice to those foreign national offenders who are
liable to deportation under Section 5(1) of the Immigration Act 1971 stating that she intends to seek a deportation order against them. Such persons may be detained by virtue of paragraph 2(2) of Schedule 3 to the Immigration Act 1971. Therefore, the reference to “intends to” is simply a way to ensure that such persons are within the ambit of the new powers while in detention. Being able to direct a search for nationality documents once a person has received such a notice but before a deportation order is made reduces the risk of documents being destroyed when the person knows that deportation is a realistic prospect. That is the purpose of the provision in its present form and why we resist the proposed amendment.
Amendments 186 to 188, 190, 192 and 193 seek to limit the Secretary of State’s disposal options on nationality documents which are not used to remove a person, by ensuring that they must be returned to the person who was previously in possession of them or who appears to be entitled to them. On that last point the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, is of course right to say that the country which issues a passport is the proprietor of that passport, while the person to whom it is issued is the user. It is therefore that country which is entitled to claim ownership, as it were, of the passport document. That touches upon the point he mentioned about the potential risk of returning a document to an issuing authority creating a danger for a person in particular circumstances. That is a point I will take away and consider because it had not immediately occurred to me in this context.
The reason why the Secretary of State should be given the wider power indicated in the present clauses is because there may be circumstances in which she would wish to remove from circulation forged or counterfeit documents. The idea that, having identified a passport as forged or counterfeit, she should return it to the person who had been using it seems a little unusual. It is in these circumstances that the wider power is sought.
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Amendment 189 reduces the definition of “nationality document” to those which might establish a person’s identity, nationality or citizenship. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, was quite right to notice that this provision does in fact follow on from Sections 44 and 45 of the United Kingdom Borders Act 2007, which contain powers for immigration officers and constables to search for nationality documents, but with a wider definition than the one suggested by Amendment 189. The reason for that is that there may be circumstances in which it is important to identify the place from which a person came, or indeed the place to which they were intending to go, in the context of whether or not they should be subject to deportation. The noble Lord also asked how or why a hotel receipt, travel guide and other such documents might be considered relevant. In that context they would be considered relevant because they might disclose the first place of safety that a person had arrived at within the European Union, for example, where the provisions of the Dublin agreement apply. It is therefore entirely appropriate that one should be able to search for such documents. They could provide a trail in circumstances where a
person may have been seeking to make repeated asylum applications in a whole series of countries once they had arrived in a relatively safe environment.
Finally, Amendment 191 seeks to ensure that the Secretary of State may retain a relevant nationality document only if she is reasonable in her suspicion that the person to whom the document relates may be liable to removal from the United Kingdom and that the document may facilitate that removal. All Ministers must comply with public law principles when exercising public functions. This includes the requirement to act reasonably. If those delegated to use such powers do not do so, that may be challenged in the courts by means of judicial review. It is therefore implicit that the Secretary of State will act reasonably in exercising the power to retain nationality documents. I should also emphasise that the wording used in Clause 26(6) is consistent with that used in Section 17 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc.) Act 2004 regarding the retention of documents that come into the possession of the Secretary of State or an immigration officer in the course of exercising an immigration function. There is consistency in the proposed legislation.
In light of these points, I hope that the noble Lord will agree to withdraw his amendment.