My Lords, I have some amendments in this group. The first is an amendment to government Amendment 47, on the power to make an LME order. Under subsection (1) of the new clause, the court must be,
“satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the person has committed, or is committing, a trigger offence”.
My amendment would change the balance of probabilities to “beyond reasonable doubt”. A trigger offence relates to offences under other legislation as well as being an offence in itself so I do not understand why the civil standard of proof is thought to be appropriate. If the answer to this is that it is in effect covered by the new clause in Amendment 49, which is different, then is there not a problem in having differing standards of proof? I would be grateful for an explanation here.
Amendment 50A is an amendment to government Amendment 50. It would leave out the provision that one of the purposes of a measure—a “prohibition, restriction or requirement”—included in an LME order is bringing it,
“to the attention of persons likely to be interested in the matter”,
and other points. If this is about communication across the actors in labour market enforcement, should it not be for the director to make sure this happens? Why is it a measure in a court order? It does not seem a matter for the courts. I can see that it may be necessary, for instance, to inform employees about an order but it seems very cumbersome and not appropriate in this context.
My final amendment in the group is an amendment to government Amendment 57, which, dealing with “Offences by bodies corporate”, defines an officer of a body corporate as including a “manager”. My amendment would take that out. I am used to seeing directors, secretaries and so on as officers of a company but a manager—though I admit I will be very out of date on company law provisions—to me means something quite different and not with the same responsibilities as a director of a company.