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Welfare Reform and Work Bill

I take the noble Baroness’s point but that was not the view of Lord Reed, which I read. I can see nowhere in his judgment where he said that we did not comply with the UNCRC but that nevertheless, because it was not incorporated, he was going to find in the Government’s favour. That is not my interpretation of reading those pages whatever.

Let me move on to the UNCRC, since we have got there. First, the judge made the point:

“As an unincorporated international treaty, the UNCRC is not part of the law of the United Kingdom (nor, it is scarcely necessary to add, are the comments upon it of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child)”.

Then comes the crucial point:

“‘The spirit, if not the precise language’, of article 3(1) has been translated into our law in particular contexts through section 11(2) of the Children Act 2004 and section 55 of the Citizenship, Borders and Immigration Act 2009”.

The judge was making it very clear that although the exact wording of the UNCRC was not applicable in the UK, the Government, through legislation, had incorporated the principles of it and were therefore complicit.

The judge went on to say that,

“it is therefore inappropriate for the courts to purport to decide whether or not the Executive has correctly understood an unincorporated treaty obligation”.

He then quoted Lord Bingham of Cornhill’s comments from a famous judgment, which I will leave aside, before noting:

“Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood expressed himself more emphatically … ‘It simply cannot be the law that, provided only a public officer asserts that his decision accords with the state’s international obligations, the courts will entertain a challenge to the decision based upon his arguable misunderstanding of that obligation and then itself decide the point of international law at issue’”.

The noble Baroness, who I greatly respect and who is very knowledgeable in this matter, quoted extensively I think from the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, who took a rather more fundamentalist view of incorporating the UNCRC into English law. She has held that position for some time, but it was not the view that the court collectively took.

I will conclude taking extracts from these turgid 95 pages shortly. The judge went on to say:

“Finally, it has been explained many times that the Human Rights Act entails some adjustment of the respective constitutional roles of the courts, the executive and the legislature, but does not eliminate the differences between them: differences, for example, in relation to their composition, their expertise, their accountability and their legitimacy. It therefore does not alter the fact that certain matters are by their nature more suitable for determination by Government or Parliament than by the courts. In so far as matters of that nature have to be considered by the courts when deciding whether executive action or legislation is compatible with Convention rights, that is something which the courts can and do properly take into account, by giving weight to the determination of those matters by the primary decision-maker”.

That decision is,

“relevant to these appeals, since the question of proportionality involves controversial issues of social and economic policy, with major implications for public expenditure. The determination of those issues is pre-eminently the function of democratically elected institutions. It is therefore necessary for the court to give due weight to the considered assessment made by those institutions. Unless manifestly without reasonable foundation, their assessment should be respected”.

In conclusion, the judge says:

“Many of the issues discussed in this appeal were considered by Parliament prior to its approving the Regulations … Furthermore, that consideration followed detailed consideration of clause 93 of the Bill, which became section 96 of the 2012 Act. It is true that the details of the cap scheme were not contained in the Bill which Parliament was debating, but the Government’s proposals had been made clear, they were challenged by means of proposed amendments to the Bill, and they were the subject of full and intense democratic debate. That is an important consideration. As Lord Bingham of Cornhill observed in R (Countryside Alliance) v Attorney General … ‘The democratic process is liable to be subverted if, on a question of moral and political judgment, opponents of the Act achieve through the courts what they could not achieve in Parliament’”.

He went on to say:

“The same is true of questions of economic and political judgment”.

I apologise for quoting extensively from those bits of the judgment. I shall not speak again on UNCRC issues, but the noble Baroness provoked me in the sense that she relied heavily on the UNCRC to somehow suggest that the Government were acting improperly or illegally and had something to fear from the Human Rights Act. That was not the view of the majority of the court.

Type
Proceeding contribution
Reference
767 cc2342-3 
Session
2015-16
Chamber / Committee
House of Lords chamber
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