I am grateful to the noble Lord. I will come on to that case; I was talking about an earlier case that the noble and learned Baroness,
Lady Hale, was involved in. I am quite aware of the outcome of the case heard earlier this year, but I thank the noble Lord for providing a trailer for what I will say later.
These amendments are prompted in part by the inadequacy of the Government’s own assessment of the human rights implication of the cap and in part by the judgment in the Supreme Court case that the noble Lord mentioned on the cap earlier this year. Both the Joint Committee on Human Rights, of which I was then a member, and the Office of the Children’s Commissioner have emphasised that child poverty is a human rights/children’s rights issue. Lowering the benefit cap clearly has implications for the number of children living in poverty. An internal assessment leaked to the Guardian in May suggested that if parents are unable to avoid the cap through paid work, it could plunge a further 40,000 children into poverty.
The impact assessment says nothing on the subject of child poverty, yet when I tabled a Written Question to ask what the impact on the number of children in poverty would be, I was referred to that impact assessment. As I said in our first session, I consider that rather insulting, as the implication was that I had not read it. I remind the Minister that the Companion makes it clear that Ministers should be as,
“‘open as possible’ in answering questions”,
as this is,
“inherent in ministerial accountability to Parliament”.
I therefore ask the Minister now, what is the department’s estimate of the impact on child poverty of reducing the cap, given that we know from the Guardian that such an estimate exists? I am quite happy to accept any provisos about possible behavioural responses but this is not a good enough reason for refusing to provide Parliament with such a crucial piece of information. Also, can the Minister tell us how the Government responded to the questions from the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child on whether a proper child rights impact assessment had been conducted and,
“the measures being taken to mitigate negative impact on the enjoyment of the rights of children, particularly those in vulnerable situations”?
The impact assessment has a section entitled “What are we doing in mitigation?”. I could summarise the contents by saying, “Not very much”. It says nothing at all about mitigation of the negative impact on the rights of children, despite the request from the UN committee. The Equality and Human Rights Commission, too, has criticised the impact assessments and the human rights memorandum which accompany the Bill for failing fully to assess the impact on equality and human rights. It warns that there is a risk to the UK’s compliance with its obligations under national and international human rights law, particularly with reference to children, women and disabled people, and therefore it gives its firm support to these amendments.
The impact assessment does at least acknowledge that women are more likely to be affected than men, as 64% of claimants who have their benefit reduced are likely to be single females—mainly lone parents. Sixty-three per cent of households capped to date have contained a child under five, and in total more than twice as many children as adults have been hit by the cap.
In the human rights memorandum, the Government note the Supreme Court’s decision, which I shall come to now. They assert that they have fully considered their obligations under the UNCRC—in particular, Article 3, which concerns the duty to treat the best interests of the child as a primary consideration. However, their analysis of the best interests of the child seems to rest on the proposition that it is in the best interests of children overall to have parents in work and that work remains the surest route out of poverty.
That would be laughably inadequate if it were not for what is at stake. As the EHRC observes, it betrays a particular lack of understanding regarding compliance with the UNCRC. It may well be in the best interests of many children for parents to find work but it will depend on the work available and on the circumstances—as has already been discussed on earlier amendments, work can represent a cul-de-sac rather than a route out of poverty. Moreover, this bald statement ignores the fact that, as my noble friend said, the great majority of those who were already subject to the cap did not find work as a result. Is it really in the best interests of children to have their standard of living reduced even further when a survey, reported in the first-year review of the operation of the cap, found that more than a third of those affected had already had to cut back on household essentials and many had incurred debt?
In fact, the Government’s position pretty much ignores the judgment of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale—echoed by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr— that it,
“misunderstand[s] what article 3(1) of the UNCRC requires”.
The final decision does not alter that fact. She continues:
“It requires that first consideration be given to the best interests, not only of children in general, but also of the particular child or children directly affected by the decision in question. It cannot possibly be in the best interests of the children affected by the cap to deprive them of the means to provide them with adequate food, clothing, warmth and housing, the basic necessities of life. It is not enough that children in general, now or in the future, may benefit by a shift in welfare culture if these are also the consequences. Insofar as the Secretary of State relies upon this as an answer to article 3(1), he has misdirected himself”.
She also pointed out that the children affected suffer from a situation which is none of their making and which they themselves can do nothing about. Can the Minister now give a more convincing response to the weighty charge that the cap, and therefore these clauses, are not in the best interests of children? As it is, the failure to give proper consideration to the best interests of the child could leave this measure vulnerable to a further future legal challenge.
In his judgment, Lord Carnwath referred to a point—mentioned by my noble friend—made during the passage through this House of the Welfare Reform Bill, which became an Act in 2012. That point was that most of the savings from the cap resulted from the inclusion of child benefits and child tax credits, even though these will be received by the great majority of those on median earnings. I shall return to this when I speak to Amendments 76 and 77. Although ultimately, Lord Carnwath sided with the judges who did not allow the appeal, he still considered that the cap did not comply with the UNCRC, and he expressed the
hope that the Government would address the implications of this when it came to reviewing the cap. Even Lord Reed, who spoke for the majority in disallowing the appeal, linked the proportionality assessment to the fact that the cap was set at median earnings. Now that, as my noble friend has made clear, there is no clear rationale for the level of the cap, as it is pushed to be below median earnings, that proportionality judgment might start to look rather different.
I have focused mainly on the implications for children’s human rights, but, as I said, the human rights of women and disabled people are also at issue. I am sure we will hear more about the more recent High Court case that found indirect discrimination against disabled people through the impact on carers, but I will not go into that now. These wider implications are another reason for my amendment to Clause 7, which requires general human rights compatibility.
I believe that these amendments should be uncontroversial. After all, if the Government are so confident that the cap is compliant with human rights instruments, they have nothing to fear from them. I hope, therefore, that the Minister will be willing to take them away and consider them.
4.15 pm