First, scheduling business is a matter entirely in the inscrutable hands of the Whips’ Office and usual channels. The Home Office has no influence on that. I take it that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, was referring to the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, who plays a very important role in the pre-legislative scrutiny of the investigatory powers Bill at present. Of course, we appreciate his expertise in this area. I am sure he will bring that fully to bear when the Bill comes before your Lordships’ House later. Let me try to deal with some of the points he raised.
One key issue he raised was: why choose to do this now when we have legislation going through? I alluded to part of the reason in my opening speech, relating to current or recent cases that have gone through the Investigatory Powers Tribunal service. There is always a balance to be struck there. The legislation proposed is just that: it is proposed—it is not on the statute book. We need to make sure that the powers are in place appropriately and that the code is kept up to date for the purposes of activities that happen in the interim.
That is an important element as well, which I would convey through the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, back to the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger. Given the noble Lord’s strong interest in these areas, I assume he would welcome these codes of practice being kept up to date in the light of case law going through the tribunal and, in particular, in relation to equipment interference. Effectively, there are now 18 pages of guidance that were previously not in the public domain. Those can now be scrutinised and reviewed. They are there to be reviewed by the committee currently sitting, should it so wish. All the way through this process with investigatory powers legislation, we are trying to make sure, at the same time, that the security services have the tools they need to do their job and that we keep the public on our side in feeling that the powers exercised—which are intrusive in certain cases—are necessary and proportionate.
I pay tribute to the work of the noble Lord, Lord Jones, on the Intelligence and Security Committee in the other place. He knows all too well about the work going on. In that context, he will be aware that the powers we are talking about are not notional or academic. Elements of investigatory powers are deployed in response to the majority of serious and organised crime, such as the seven terrorist acts over the past year prevented by the security services. I certainly join the noble Lord in paying tribute to the work those services do to keep us safe.
I shall deal with some of the other issues raised. I will come back to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, that in a sense our argument is that there is nothing new here and, at the same time, we are introducing some new measures. I will be able to tell him what is new in this.
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked if, before now, it was an offence under the Computer Misuse Act to interfere with equipment. The answer is no. The powers to undertake equipment interference are contained in the Intelligence Services Act 1994 and the Police Act 1997, so we do not believe that at any point the police or security services have operated outside their powers. The noble Lord asked about the number of thematic equipment interference warrants that have been requested. That information is not collected centrally at present. Of course, we also have as part of the investigatory powers a quite sophisticated system of commissioners who oversee these processes, to whom those who feel that their rights have been trespassed on wrongly can go to seek redress—either directly through the commissioner or through the tribunal. Of course, that happens.
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The noble Lord asked whether the police use these powers, too, and why the code does not apply to them. The police use equipment interference alongside other intelligence-gathering and surveillance techniques necessary to investigate serious crime. Activities are currently carried out under property interference authorisations under Part III of the Police Act 1997, alongside other authorisations as appropriate. The code of practice for covert surveillance and property interference refers to these powers for law enforcement use. The use of search warrants and production orders is well understood by Parliament and the public, and these powers are subject to strict safeguards and robust oversight. The investigatory powers Bill referred to both intelligence agencies’ and law enforcement agencies’ use of these powers.
As for whether the power on equipment interference is a new one that has not been debated by Parliament, no, we believe it is an existing power. I have covered that point before. It is currently authorised under Sections 5 and 7 of the Intelligence Services Act 1994 and can be used only when it is necessary and proportionate so to do.
As I said on opening, the safeguards described in the codes are not in themselves new. In respect of the interception code, the law enforcement and intelligence agencies have always had robust internal arrangements, as the noble Lord, Lord Jones, said, overseen by the
Interception of Communications Commissioner. The draft code provides more detail about those arrangements. First, it provides additional information on the safeguards that exist for the interception and handling of external communications under Section 8(4) of RIPA, particularly the ability to undertake bulk interceptions. Secondly, it sets out further information on the protections afforded to legally privileged material. Both elements were key concerns when we previously debated the matter in your Lordships’ House. With those reassurances, I hope that the Committee feels able to accept these orders.