Amendment 5 sets a default term of office for an elected mayor of a combined authority area and a default date of the election for the return of an elected mayor for a combined authority area. Amendment 8 is a minor and technical amendment.
As the Bill currently stands, the term of office and the date of election are set by order by the Secretary of State. Following the comments of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee and an amendment brought forward by the noble Lords, Lord McKenzie and Lord Beecham, in Committee, we wish to include default provisions in the Bill to apply in cases where specific orders are not made.
The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee suggested that the Bill’s order-making powers should be limited to specifying the timing and frequency of metro mayor elections only at the initial establishment of the office of mayor. We do not believe it right to limit the order-making power in this way, as I shall explain, but to provide some assurance that with Amendment 5 we are following the precedent in the Local Government Act 2000, which was referred to by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. It provides in the Bill default timings of mayoral elections and the mayoral term. Equally, to retain the flexibility needed, the Secretary of State will be able to make specific orders under paragraphs 2(a) and 2(c) of new Schedule 5B to the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009. The amendments providing for the default position in no way curtail the scope of the order-making powers in Schedule 5B.
The ability for the Secretary of State to set the timings of elections by order allows for the fact that there is currently no single pattern of local elections across the country with which a new mayoral election may be synchronised. It also recognises that devolution deals will be bespoke, and therefore it is possible that different arrangements may be sought by, and agreed with, different areas. For example, an area may wish its mayoral election to be held in a year when there are no council elections, but another area may wish to combine mayoral and council elections. Again, for example, while we expect that probably most deals with metro mayors will have mayoral terms of four years, it is possible that an area may wish to have, say, five-year terms similar to the parliamentary term.
Returning to the default position that we are providing, it reflects that in general a mayoral term will be four years and the election will take place at the same time as council elections in the combined authority area. Hence, under the default provisions, the first election of the mayor will take place at the next local council elections not less than six months after the order creating the mayoral combined authority comes into force, and elections will be every four years thereafter.
Amendment 8 is a minor and technical amendment to ensure that the provision in the Bill applies equally to the disqualification of an individual in respect of their being, or being elected as, a mayor, as well as more specifically in relation to their being, or being elected as, the mayor for that area.
5.45 pm
Before I sit down, it may be helpful if I speak to the amendments proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Grocott. Amendment 6 seeks to ensure that a mayoral term of office should be limited to four years. As I have explained, we do not believe that it would be right to restrict the mayoral term in this way. This Bill is very much an enabling Bill, and I believe it is right that this legislation has a degree of flexibility, enabling us to respond to proposals that chime with and reflect local requirements. Hence, we would not wish to rule out the possibility of, say, a five-year term if that is what the area wanted and, of course, if that is what Parliament agreed when approving the order.
With Amendment 7, the noble Lord seeks to limit the number of terms of office that any individual may serve as a mayor for a combined authority to two terms. Some may see that such a provision would serve to re-energise and revitalise the leadership of a combined authority, ensuring that it did not become too comfortable and forcing, in a sense, the injection of new ideas and a new direction, particularly in areas that may have a strong and stable political affiliation that may not, on the face of it, create or nurture the environment for such change.
However, we have concerns about term limits. First, and in a vein that will be familiar from the debate to date, I am concerned that it would introduce a degree of prescription in the Bill that sits uneasily with the devolutionary and enabling legislative framework that we are seeking to introduce. However, and more importantly, any such prescription would start to cut across the rights of local people—local electors—to determine who they should be led by. Imposing on the electorate of an area a requirement that, for example, a strong leader with a clear vision for the future and a record of delivering against that vision should be forcibly stood down, with that decision being taken out of the hands of those who had elected that person in the first place, goes very much against the grain and is unlikely to be welcomed by the people who elected him or her.
We have spoken about accountability. Noble Lords will know my views on the importance of the elected mayor being held to account by his or her electorate. That electorate will continue to have their opportunity to either endorse the incumbent or select a successor. I hope these comments are helpful, and I beg to move Amendment 5.