My Lords, the short answer to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and to get to the heart of it, is that we believe that “knows or suspects” is an established term. It has been used in, for example, Section 21A of the Terrorism Act 2000, Section 2(16) of the Criminal Justice Act 1987—
“Where any person—
(a) knows or suspects that an investigation by the police or the Serious Fraud Office”—
and Section 83ZN(4) of the Banking Act 2009, which states:
“(4) A person who knows or suspects that an investigation is being or is likely to be conducted under section 83ZC”.
I simply cite the examples to show that this is a term which has broad acceptance. However, I shall take up the noble Lord’s invitation to put on the record a few words to expand on what is meant by these clauses.
Amendments 35, 36 and 37 seek to make a slight change to the mental element of the offences in Clauses 4 and 5, which relate to the production and supply of
psychoactive substances. In drafting these offences, we consulted the national policing lead for new psychoactive substances and the Crown Prosecution Service. We believe that the current formulation of these offences is proportionate and fair, capturing those individuals who intentionally produce, supply or offer to supply these dangerous substances while not criminalising accidental behaviour.
To satisfy the mental elements of the production offence, the prosecution must show that the production is intentional, that the defendant knew or suspected that the substance is a psychoactive substance, and that the defendant must either intend to consume the psychoactive substance for its psychoactive effects, or know or be reckless as to whether the psychoactive substance is likely to be consumed by another person for its psychoactive effects. The mental elements of the supply offence in Clause 5 are similar; namely, that the prosecution must show that supplying the substance is intentional, that the defendant knew or suspected, or ought to know or suspect, that the substance is a psychoactive substance, and the defendant must know or be reckless as to whether the psychoactive substance is likely to be consumed by the person to whom it is supplied or by another person for its psychoactive effects.
Amendments 35 to 37 seek to remove “suspects” and replace it with “thinks”. Given the two words’ natural meaning, the requirement of each is very similar. However, we believe that the use of “think” raises the bar too high in terms of what must be proved. Thinking something suggests that a person needs to be “satisfied” or “believe” that something is the case—I am having a moment of déjà vu here with the then Serious Crime Bill, because we went through the mens rea discussions then—which is a higher test than that which we propose. The formula “knows or suspects” is commonly used in the criminal law to describe the mental element or mens rea of the offence. It is a phrase that is well understood. “Knows” demonstrates a true belief. Suspicion is a subjective test and need not be based on reasonable grounds, but there must be a possibility which is more than fanciful that the relevant facts exist. The courts have held that a “vague feeling of unease” would not suffice to prove suspicion, but the suspicion need not be “clearly” or “firmly” grounded and targeted on specific facts or based upon reasonable grounds.
The Government considered whether the mental element should extend only as far as “knows”, but we concluded that this could create an inappropriately high bar for prosecutors to overcome, with defendants arguing that they did not know for certain that the substance they were producing or supplying was a psychoactive substance. Given, as I have said, that a “knows or suspects” test is commonly used in the criminal law, I am satisfied that it is well understood by investigators, prosecutors and defence lawyers. I am therefore not persuaded of the case for change.
Under Clause 5(2) there are two limbs to the offer to supply offence. First, person A must offer to supply a psychoactive substance to person B. The second limb requires that person A knows or is reckless as to whether person B, or some other person, would, if a substance was supplied in accordance with the offer,
be likely to consume the substance for its psychoactive effects. I realise that these are complex legal terms, but I have to say that they probably fit well with a number of cases that I have personally looked into. I am thinking of head shops selling psychoactive substances in bright packaging. To avoid prosecution, the label states that the substance is plant food or a research chemical that is not for human consumption. Clearly, that is what we are aiming to get at so that there is no loophole. Given the way this second limb operates, no offence would be committed if the substance that was in fact supplied was not a psychoactive substance. It will come as no surprise to noble Lords that not all drug dealers are entirely honest. An offer may be made to supply a psychoactive substance, but the person making the offer may intend to defraud the recipient by passing off some benign white powder as the real thing. Indeed the person making the offer may not intend to supply anything, but simply take the money and run. Clause 5(3) is intended to catch those circumstances. What matters here is that the defendant made an offer to supply a psychoactive substance and should not be able to evade prosecution under Clause 5 on the grounds that he or she did not intend to fulfil their side of the deal.
I accept the probing nature of the amendment and I hope that the noble Lord will find that these explanations, even if they have not entirely satisfied him, have allowed us to put some additional remarks on the record that may be helpful in understanding the Government’s intent in bringing forward this clause.
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