My Lords, I understand that these are probing amendments which seek an explanation of some of the drafting in Schedule 1. Amendments 30 to 33 broadly deal with the same point, although Amendment 33 is in different terms to the others.
I am hesitant to say this following that which we have just heard but, taking alcohol as an example, Schedule 1 defines an alcoholic product as,
“any product which … contains alcohol, and … does not contain any psychoactive substance”.
The question is why the second limb of this definition does not refer to “any other psychoactive substance”. The answer is logical but, needless to say, not entirely straightforward. It hinges on the distinction between the natural meaning of the term “psychoactive substance” and the meaning given to that term by the Bill.
Under Clause 2, as we now all know, a psychoactive substance is a substance which,
“is capable of producing a psychoactive effect in a person who consumes it, and”—
importantly—
“is not an exempted substance”.
Alcohol is an exempted substance and so is not a psychoactive substance for the purposes of the Bill. It is therefore not necessary to refer in the definition of alcoholic product to “any other psychoactive substance” because we have already excluded alcohol from the definition of a psychoactive substance. I hope that makes sense.
Amendment 34 touches on a different issue—food additives and flavourings. These are already authorised under the EU legislation so the reference in paragraph 10 of Schedule 1 to an EU instrument—ugly though that may sound—is all that is required. My understanding is that this amendment would expand the paragraph referred to to read “an EU or other applicable instrument”. However, only EU instruments are relevant here and so the additional words are not required. I should perhaps add that we have discussed and agreed with the Food Standards Agency the approach taken in paragraph 10 in Schedule 1.
The noble Baroness suggested that the additional words might provide future-proofing. However, I remind her that there is a regulation-making power in Clause 3 designed with that in mind. In the light of this rather complicated explanation, I hope the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw her amendment.