My Lords, no one could possibly fault my noble friend for lack of persistence or focus, and no one would not want the best legislation for tackling—or, better, preventing—offences against children. I am afraid that I cannot support her amendment. I am sorry about that because I know her ambitions for the Bill, but I understand many of the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Howarth, about practice. I would have thought that the point just made by the noble and learned Lord about cannabis farms was also one about practice and observation by the police; I would not have thought that a new offence was needed for that to be dealt with properly.
I have heard it said that a separate offence would mean that the police would take the matter seriously, but what we have heard from the criminal justice professionals, as other noble Lords have said, is that it is not a matter of an alternative but that there would
be real risks to Part 1 of the Bill. They argue not just that a separate offence is not necessary—we often hear in this Chamber that something is not necessary and tend to ask, “Well, what harm would it do?”—but that in this case there would be harm. Alison Saunders and Kevin Hyland referred to the issue of determining age, which noble Lords have mentioned. This has bedevilled claims for asylum and responses to asylum seekers for a long time.
To add to the point that the noble and learned Baroness made, in relation to the letter that several of us received today from Kevin Hyland, the point about the case which he discussed with her was not just that so much time was spent on the issue of the woman’s age but that, as he writes, it was,
“distracting the jury from the real issue of her exploitation”.
I take that very seriously. I also take the point made by Alison Saunders that the clause would require evidence beyond reasonable doubt that the accused,
“believed, or had reasonable grounds for believing”,
that the person was under 18.
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One briefing that we had asked how the evidential barriers would be overcome. The Government’s answer is not to require that bit of evidence. Consent and issues of age are in a sense excluded when one looks at other changes that have been made to the Bill.
Mention was made in the statements that the Minister circulated to guidance and sentencing guidelines. I have already referred to the fact that Clause 1 provides that regard “may be had” to certain factors. I do not know whether the Minister can help us about the weight of that “may”. Is it in normal parlance “shall” when we couple it with “have regard to”—because of course age is an issue in all this?
I very much take the points made about training. We have compared trafficking with domestic violence and how practice in dealing with domestic violence—which is by no means perfect—has progressed over the years. That, too, has been a matter of applying existing law in many cases.
In Committee, the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of Cradley, referred to future-proofing. She was of course right about new forms of evil being found, but we cannot future-proof at the expense of clarity in the present. The term in the clause, “practices similar to slavery”, worries me on that score.
Finally, I do not want to risk devaluing or demoting offences against adults by introducing the possibility that they would not be recognised because they are treated differently and separately from those against children. Vulnerable adults, too, need that help and support.
In Committee, I mentioned the directive which refers to a child-sensitive approach, but it does not provide for a separate offence. Thinking about it again, it seems to me that being child sensitive—we should be and the Bill is—does not require a separate offence.