My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, for his observations. He will know that the judiciary had some concerns about the scheme, one of which turned on the importance of the independence of the judiciary and of attracting appropriate candidates to posts within the judiciary at whatever level. I am sure that Members of the Committee will understand both of those points. A particular concern that was expressed by many in the consultations was about the changes that were to take place to
ensure that the judiciary came under the scheme which embraces all other senior civil servants. There was a particular provision which followed the judiciary’s own stand-alone scheme that is set out paragraph 8.2 of the Explanatory Memorandum. It concerned in particular those whose existing arrangements for their pensions were unregistered so that when they came to accept a judicial appointment, they did so on the basis that their then pensions were unregistered, only to find that as a result of these provisions, the pension in their new post became registered. The result of that was a significant disadvantage to them, and therefore after some consideration, it was thought appropriate for there to be a special arrangement for the judges in that particular position.
The result of the special arrangement was that those who had previously had an unregistered pension could opt out of the government scheme and they would not receive the pension to which they would normally be entitled. However, during the time that they sit as judges, they will receive an increased salary to reflect the fact that their employer—the Government—would be paying a proportion of their income for pensions in the same way that they would in ordinary circumstances, and will be doing for judges in all other cases. This means that although there is an advantage to the individual, it is in fact neutral in terms of the effect on the tax take as a whole. That was the position.
Judges choose representatives to the pension board —I am talking now of governance—and make recommendations to the scheme manager on the question of discretion. The scheme was at the judiciary’s request. There is an increase in costs in the administration of that special scheme. On the scheme generally, the Government’s principle was to develop a scheme that is fair and sustainable for public sector workers and the taxpayer generally and, save for this fairly limited exception, the judicial scheme will bring the judiciary in line, for the first time, in fact, with the reformed Civil Service pension scheme Alpha, while there are some differences, which I have explained. There are also some slight differences in ill health provision, but any benefits to the department will be long term in nature due to the transitional protection provisions which apply to a considerable proportion of the judicial office holders in scope. However, there is a long-term financial benefit to the MoJ in the form of savings from the service award. This is a salary payment to judges upon retirement which compensates them for tax liabilities on their retirement lump sum. The cost to the department of the current annual service award is around £17 million per year. As the new scheme requirements will remove the need for service awards in the long term, this cost will be a saving to the department, and thus to the country in general. There is harmonisation. There are one or two exceptions.
We think judges have satisfactory pension arrangements. In the view of judges, they are not quite as satisfactory as they were before, but in view of the recommendations of the noble Lord, Lord Hutton, which were accepted by the Government, all public servants have had to accept some reductions in their entitlement in view of the overall financial situation, and judges are not considered an exception, but there
is some reflection of their particular circumstances in those special arrangements. I hope that that is a satisfactory answer to the noble Lord’s questions.