My Lords, these amendments would require the Government to publish two reviews of the impact of pensions flexibility. I will explain again to noble Lords why the Government believe that they are unnecessary. First, on the issue of the request for distributional analysis,
“by income decile of the population”,
Amendment 23 seeks to require that the Government review the distributional impact of pensions flexibility no less than 18 months after the Bill takes effect. As set out during debate on the Taxation of Pensions Bill, pensions flexibility does not have a direct consequential impact on household incomes. Distributional effects will be driven by the choices individuals make about how and when to take their pension. In addition, household income is not necessarily a reliable measure of pension wealth, particularly in the years immediately prior to retirement. It is possible that the impacts of this policy could be misrepresented if we were to review them only against the distribution of household income.
Turning next to the issue of behavioural analysis which we discussed in Committee, the costing of tax policies often takes account of how individuals will behave in response to them. The assumptions that underpin this behavioural assessment and the methodologies used to arrive at them are certified by the independent OBR. The assessment of how people will behave is, of course, fundamental to the costings that the Government published in the Budget for the impact of pensions flexibility on the Exchequer. The policy costings note
published alongside the Budget sets out in detail how the figures have been calculated and so how the Government have estimated the number of people who will access their pension flexibly.
Although I will not describe that methodology in detail here, it is freely and publicly available. Additionally, the Government have set out information elsewhere on the number of people they expect to access their money flexibly. The Tax Information and Impact Note published at the Budget and updated since states that the Government expect,
“around 130,000 individuals a year to access their pension flexibly”.
Policy costings notes set out the assumptions and methodologies underlying costings for tax and annually managed expenditure policy decisions. This practice was established at the June Budget 2010 and reflects the principles outlined in Tax Policy Making: A New Approach, published alongside the Budget that year. This publication is part of the Government’s wider commitment to increased transparency. However, as discussed in Committee, the Treasury considers that in certain circumstances—usually regarding tax-planning and avoidance—making more detailed behavioural assumptions public can have the potential to affect the behaviour they relate to, and can as such be potentially detrimental to policy-making. I reassure noble Lords that the Government will be closely monitoring the behaviour of individuals through tax data when the new system comes into force. This will also be made public through the significant amounts of data on tax receipts and liabilities that HMRC publishes annually.
Both these amendments would also require reviews of the effects of pensions flexibility on the Exchequer, including the impact on income tax, national insurance contributions and the use of salary sacrifice arrangements. When considering this, it is important to note that at the Autumn Statement the Government published estimates of the Exchequer impact of the policy as a whole. These costings, which were certified by the independent Office for Budget Responsibility, cover all the changes made to the policy since the Budget as a result of consultation.
As noted earlier, table 2.1 of the Autumn Statement document set out the total impact of these decisions publicly. After debate on this subject in the other place during the passage of the Taxation of Pensions Act, the Financial Secretary to the Treasury wrote to the former committee for the Act, setting out these impacts. This included costings for the £10,000 annual allowance, which the Government have introduced to protect the flexibilities from being used by individuals to gain unintended tax advantages.
Turning first to the issue of salary sacrifice, as I explained in Committee, the costings published as part of the Autumn Statement are based on the same central assumptions that underpin the costings published at the Budget. Since the Budget, the Government have explored in more detail the effect of salary sacrifice on this costing. These costings have been scrutinised by the OBR, which was created to provide independent and credible analysis of the public finances. In line with standard practice, these are accounted for as changes to the forecast and so are not outlined in table 2.1 of the Autumn Statement document.
In recognition of the concern raised by Members in the debate on the Taxation of Pensions Act about the likely impact of salary sacrifice on the Exchequer, the Government’s estimates of these costs were included in the letter sent by the Financial Secretary, and I outlined them in Committee. As the Financial Secretary stated in the debate on the Taxation of Pensions Act in the other place, the Government will be closely monitoring behaviour under the new system and will work closely with industry to ensure that the system remains fair and proportionate.
The Government therefore believe that there is no need for further legislation in relation to reviews of the Exchequer impacts of this policy, as the Government have already published a significant amount of information and have committed to keeping the Exchequer impacts under review through the usual processes.
Amendment 23 contains a provision that would require that any published review include any impact the pensions flexibility measures might have on the sale of annuities. Data on annuity sales will continue to be available through other channels, such as the data published by the ABI and publications by individual firms. For the Government to review this would be an unnecessary duplication of information already in the public domain.
As I have set out, much of the information requested by this amendment is already in the public domain, published as part of the fiscal process. I hope that that will satisfy the noble Lord. He asked me a specific question about whether his assumption in Committee was correct. I believe it is; if I am wrong, I will write to him. But in the mean time, I hope he will withdraw his amendment.