That is the point. Shadow directors can be significant shareholders who have chosen not to sit on the board—in particular, a lender who has become active in the affairs of a business—or simply someone in whose interests and according to whose instructions the directors act, without the person actually being a director. The Bill seeks to clarify the rules governing shadow directors so that people do not deliberately assume that status in order to avoid a lighter touch corporate governance regime. Indeed, the definition of shadow director is not changed by the Bill, only the extent to which they should enjoy the same duties as directors.
At present, the duties of directors apply to shadow directors to the extent permitted by common law rules and equitable principles. These are set out in Section 170 to 177 of the Companies Act and offer up a code of conduct. Clause 86(3) would enable the Secretary of State to make regulations to apply any duties of directors to such shadow directors. The Bill makes provision for the duties of directors to apply to shadow directors,
“where … they are capable of so applying”,
as my noble friend said. This wording, quite apart from adding certainty, will do the opposite and leave the courts little discretion to allow them to apply said duties in a proportionate manner. This wording, “capable of so applying”, amounts to some sort of blanket application of duties from one to the other since it is difficult to conceive of a situation where the duty would be incapable of applying.
Of particular interest is the duty to avoid conflicts of interest. It is not often possible to prevent a conflict from arising, and therefore the prima facie duty to avoid conflicts is typically addressed by having some mechanics: for example, one frequently sees a director excusing himself from any meetings considering such matters which might present a conflict and thus being prevented from voting. The Companies Act specifically considers these mechanisms but, of course, it will not be possible to apply them to shadow directors, who may not seek to be shadow directors and may not even be aware that they are. This could result in an automatic breach of the duty by entirely innocent shadow directors, so I would argue that more flexibility is required.
This is why the amendment offers up an alternative wording, which says that duties will apply,
“to the extent it is reasonable, just and equitable for any such general duty to apply”—
it certainly sounds reasonable to me—and caters for examples such as conflicts of interest. It still allows for the Secretary of State to make an intervention, as well as giving the courts the requisite discretion, but it will prevent the inherent unfairness in the situation that I have just described.