My Lords, my Amendment 35X draws attention to the importance of the Localism Act and the Public Services (Social Value) Act by adding a new clause after Clause 39, in part in parallel to some of the remarks made by the noble Lords, Lord McKenzie at Luton and Lord Whitty. I find their arguments not entirely without foundation but I hope they will forgive me if I say that I do not find them especially nuanced to reflect the reality on the ground. I will take a few minutes to explain why I have reached that conclusion and then ask my noble friend to put some flesh on the bones of the philosophy behind what the Government seek to achieve.
My interest in this topic arose from my appointment by the Cabinet Office as the chairman of a task force to look at aspects of government regulation that affect the growth of smaller charities and voluntary groups. The report that we produced, entitled Unshackling Good Neighbours, focused on three things: what stopped people volunteering; what stopped people giving money at an individual level; and what stopped charities and voluntary groups growing. It identified a number of factors about why these groups were inhibited. High among them was the question of commissioning by the Government both at national and local level. I was very pleased to see that this issue had made it into the Bill following further work by my noble friend Lord Young of Graffham and I referred to the topic in my speech at Second Reading. I was subsequently approached to have discussions with the LGA, which provided me with a draft of Amendment 35X, which I have tabled. I fear that the LGA will not entirely like what I have to say, so I need to put on record my thanks to it.
I understand the point of the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, that the drafting of Clauses 38 and 39 could give rise to concern that the underlying purpose may amount to a land grab by central government. However, I have to say to the Committee that, from my research and my report, all parties at every level have lessons to learn about commissioning, procurement and how to increase local involvement and participation in the communities that they serve. Very often, seemingly perverse decisions by local or national government are not the result of malice aforethought but overly heavy bureaucratic procedures.
Several hundred examples were sent in to us and I would like to touch on three to show the Committee the background to the points I am driving at. The first, from a national point of view, is from a local hospice in Worcestershire that had been providing end-of-life palliative care on a 25-page contract to the local primary care trust. It came to the end of its contract and asked to sign another 25-page contract. It was told that it could not do that any more. The new model contract ran to 130 pages with 111 pages of guidance. When I asked the Department of Health why that was, it was explained that this was a contract for all seasons. You were supposed to take blocks out of it to suit your particular purpose. Of course, the
PCT had passed on the whole thing and said, “Sort it out yourself”. When this was explained to the Department of Health, one could persuade it to go back to the earlier, simpler model.
At the local level, a London borough sent us a letter saying:
“Voluntary organisations are told we need to move from grant funding to contracting, but too often tenders”,
from local authorities,
“are written with onerous conditions, both in applying and in reporting, for quite small contracts. (I have a 68-page tender we had to complete, together with supporting documents, to provide out-of-school-hours activities for disabled children in one London borough for £10,000)”.
So that amounts to 68 pages for a total contract value of £10,000.
Then again, Solihull SUSTAiN and Colebridge Trust secured a grant for the local authority to deliver a £200,000 project. They were clever enough to secure some pro bono support from a local hotel where they could hold their meetings, as a result of which they were able to make a £600 profit on a £200,000 contract. The local authority spent a great deal of time chasing them to return the £600, which they could have retained or used to build their operation a bit further. So I argue very strongly that there is work to be done in this area and that the challenge is to find the right balance between the one-size-fits-all approach, to which the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie of Luton, referred, which tends to result in overly prescriptive national standards, and local standard setting, which can be equally overprescriptive and in a way that does not necessarily best serve the local community. Behind it all in our research was the risk-averse approach often adopted by many commissioners at local and national level, which disadvantages smaller local charities and voluntary groups.
I recognise the work that the LGA has carried out in establishing a national procurement strategy, to which the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, referred, but equally I recognise and support the Government’s commitment to localism. I conclude that the best way to find this elusive balance is for the Government to make it clear that these regulations are intended to set standards and yardsticks for good practice, on which local authorities have some flexibility in application. If I may use the “comply or explain” approach, those noble Lords who are familiar with corporate governance will know that those codes lay down standards with which you are expected to comply—and if you cannot comply with them, you have to explain why not. That approach would give the flexibility to avoid the straitjacket of one-size-fits-all and, at the same time, enable egregious behaviour by local authorities to be identified and prevented.
Such statements could be seen to be a little bland, so I should like to put a little flesh on these bones with some examples of the sorts of topics that I hope would be covered by the regulations—my shopping list, so to speak—which would give reassurance to local and national government and to those who will provide the services. The commissioners should work more closely to understand their motivation and the potential value that they can add in their contracts.
Secondly—I know that the LGA will hate this— the PQQs should be dispensed with. To be honest, the PQQs that I have seen could easily be filled in by the local authority using either Companies House returns, Charity Commission returns, or other local information.
Thirdly, tender documents should be proportionate to the value of the contract being awarded. Too often, as in the example that I have given, very small contracts have very large tender documents attached to them. Commissioners should also think carefully about the number of tenders that they seek, particularly for the small contracts below, say, £50,000 or £100,000. Of course, they have a duty to ensure value for public money, but there can be only one winner. If a commissioner decides that, to avoid controversy, he will accept a large number of tenders, he is inevitably inflicting a degree of economic efficiency and organisational friction on the losers.
The monitoring processes should be fixed for a contract. Too often they are moved in the middle of the contract, which changes the basis for measurement mid-contract and adds an unnecessary strain. The costs of monitoring should also be related to the size of the contract. Last but not least, there needs to be some mechanism for a proper sharing of risk and reward between prime contractors and their subcontractors. Too often the prime contractors take the easy ones and leave the more difficult cases to the sub-contractor.
I appreciate that these are pretty detailed requests, but this is an area where detail matters. The LGA has properly raised concerns about upsetting the balance between local and national government, so an explanation of the philosophical and practical purposes behind these clauses would do much to reassure us. I hope that my noble friend can help on this score.