My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 65A and 69A in this group, and I of course welcome Amendment 65. I endorse everything that has been said by my battle-hardened friend, who speaks from experience.
We on these Benches are very supportive of the new anti-slavery commissioner, who will undoubtedly play a pivotal role in our fight against modern slavery. Although we acknowledge and are grateful for the good work that numerous central government departments, local government agencies and NGOs do in this area, a main point of contact to co-ordinate and oversee the entirety of the work to tackle modern slavery is invaluable—vital.
The Centre for Social Justice’s report looking into modern slavery in 2013 stated:
“Such diverse activity requires independent oversight and coordination for it to be effective”,
and:
“There is significant need in the UK for the appointment of a single individual to oversee efforts to fight modern slavery in the UK, in light of the disparate national response”.
So we warmly welcome the introduction of this post. As noble Lords will know, Kevin Hyland has already been appointed as the new commissioner. I am sure that this gentleman will do an excellent job and we welcome him to his post. However, I feel that it is a premature appointment; it has been made before this House has even finished its debate on this role and finalised its discussions. It cannot be right that any appointment is made before the job description is finalised. I just do not think that is the correct way to proceed.
At present, we do not feel that the clause as drafted would ensure that the independence of the anti-slavery commissioner is embedded. We thank the Government for introducing “Independent” into the title of the role but the insertion of the word is simply not enough. By merely calling the role independent without providing the structure to make that independence possible, the Government are almost setting the commissioner up
to fail by making it virtually impossible for him to meet the expectations created by the title “Independent Anti- slavery Commissioner”. The funds, staff, accommodation and other facilities will still be determined by the Secretary of State, after consultation with the commissioner.
Amendment 65A, which is similar to that in the name of my noble friend Lord Warner and the noble Lord, Lord Patel, would change the wording of the clause to ensure that the Secretary of State may only determine how much money to give the commissioner, without having any involvement in the appointment of the staff or other matters. At Second Reading, the Minister stated:
“The commissioner’s role is set out in a similar way to other commissioners”.—[Official Report, 17/11/14; col. 239.]
However, I beg to differ. Having looked at the Borders Act 2007, we have used the same language and inserted it into our first amendment to enable this anti-slavery commissioner to have the same independence as others in similar roles. That is the same approach taken by the draft committee, which also adopted this wording in its alternative modern slavery Bill. Alongside this, the independent reviewer of terrorism stressed the need for a truly independent commissioner to the draft Bill committee to put it on an equal footing with himself and similar appointments, such as that of the Children’s Commissioner.
Our second amendment, Amendment 69A, is to ensure that the commissioner has full independence with regard to his activities, timetables, priorities, resources and funding. It has been drafted by the Anti-Trafficking Monitoring Group, with the help of respected and experienced barristers and legal experts. Rapporteurs in other European countries, such as the Dutch national rapporteur, all cite their autonomy and independence as being crucial to their role. We absolutely have to ensure that the wording in the Bill reflects the true independence of the commissioner. Although we know that the current Home Secretary visualises a strong and leading role for this commissioner, which is terrific, the same may not be said for any future Home Secretaries or Ministers down the line—and her assurances must be consistent with the language in the Bill. I note what my noble friend said about the Home Office as an institution.
The Independent Police Complaints Commission stressed the importance of the commissioner being able to appoint their own staff and said that the perception of that independence, if not its reality, may be affected by its statutory closeness to the department—in this case, the Home Office. The independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, David Anderson QC, told the committee that roles such as the one performed by his specialist adviser were essential, and that it was consequentially essential that he made the decision about the appointment himself. The Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, John Vine, also pointed out the benefits of the commissioner being able to appoint their own staff in that they should be able to advertise for the roles freely and choose from a good mix of skills and applicants.
In written evidence, the Home Office stated that its intention was to have a small team of civil servants supporting the commissioner. If that situation arose, it is all very well to support but we do not want those
people to be appointed by the Home Office. Is the Minister able to shed light on how they would be able to work in an independent manner if they were, at the end of the day, accountable as employees to the Home Office? There would seem to be a friction there.
In the Government’s response to the draft committee, they said:
“It would not be effective or efficient for such a role to be supported by an independent human resources function”.
Surely, appropriate assistance could be provided to the commissioner when choosing his own staff, if it were necessary and requested.
Our concerns were also echoed by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which said that,
“the Commissioner looks very much like a creature of the Home Office, with very little interaction with Parliament”.
Notwithstanding the matters in Clause 41, which we will speak about next week, the Joint Committee also pointed to the inability of the commissioner to appoint their own staff. The committee recommended that the Bill be amended to change this, otherwise the commissioner’s operations would be largely controlled by the Home Office, as I have said before.
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The location of the role within the Home Office and its lack of structural independence mean that questions about transparency and independence will hang over any reports made by the commissioner, which takes me back to what my noble friend said about trust. It is vital that this person and the reports that they provide must have the full trust of the citizens of this country, especially those who are subjected to the evils of slavery. It is important that the anti-slavery commissioner is seen to be independent of the Government and has the ability to co-operate with other groups, organisations and sectors, which is a huge part of their role. The Finnish and Dutch models both have clear organisational frameworks that are widely considered to be successful in fighting human trafficking, so why are these models and that real evidence of good practice from other countries not considered appropriate when considering our own version? What is different about our system?
Once again, we welcome the new role of the Independent Anti-slavery Commissioner, but we are concerned about the independence. The current drafting of the Bill does not have the adequate statutory safeguards intended, and leaves the role open to misuse in the long term. This is not only inconsistent with the roles of other international commissioners but inconsistent with our own other independent commissioners, reviewers or chief inspectors as laid out in other legislation. When questioned, the Government have recognised the significant differences between the legislative frameworks governing the Children’s Commissioner and the proposed anti-slavery commissioner, but they somehow still maintain that both models produce independent bodies. For all the reasons given, I simply cannot understand how this can be the case.
We have tabled Amendment 65A because we believe that to accomplish the high aims envisaged for the commissioner, they must also be able to challenge the Government as well as local authorities and law enforcement agencies. It should not be necessary to
rely on the personal gravitas, expertise and independent-mindedness of the individual appointed as the commissioner; rather, the commissioner should be equipped with the resources and statutory independent status necessary to play the role of a critical voice both in private and in public.