My Lords, I underscore what the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence, has just said about the reason for the Bill. However, one has to remember that the idea of introducing laws to enable prosecutions to take place is not primarily for the purpose of having prosecutions: it is for the purpose of preventing conduct that is subject to prosecution. In so far as it is successful, it will do that. The number of prosecutions that happen under an Act is not necessarily the best test of whether the Act has been successful. If the conduct which is penalised under the Act stops, that is the best kind of success you can have, and with no prosecutions at all you are even better off.
I entirely accept the view that the Bill should clearly be dealing with the complete amelioration of the tragic circumstances of those who are subject to slavery, trafficking or exploitation. However, I wonder a little about the way in which the proposed new clause is constructed. First, I entirely agree with the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, that judges of a Family Division know exactly what is meant by the “best interests” of the child in relation to disputes between parents about the child’s future. However, this is a more difficult issue. I shall make another point about that in a minute. To what extent does the court have power to determine the future circumstances of a victim of slavery, for example? That is a very important aspect of securing the best interests of the victim. I think we all would like to see the best interests of the victim secured but how you go about that, and which powers the court needs to secure that, is something we need to hear a little more about.
Secondly, I find it hard to distinguish between the circumstances in proposed new subsection (1) and those in proposed new subsection (2). I think that the court is a public authority. However, the power is based on interpretation by the court. The court has to interpret the provisions in such a way as to secure the best interests of the victim, whereas in proposed new subsection (2), it is a question of the public authorities and the Secretary of State, in exercising the powers given by the Bill and, ultimately, the Act, having the power to secure the best interests of the victim. I find it hard to know why that should be different and why proposed new subsections (1) and (2) should not have exactly the same framework. I do not object at all to the court being specially mentioned as one of the public authorities, but the powers conferred by proposed new subsection (2) would be better from the point of view of achieving the result in question.
There seems to be a somewhat unnecessary elaboration in proposed new subsection (3). It starts saying what the personal circumstances are but then gives up and
refer to anything else that is relevant. Starting to make a definition that you cannot effectively complete strikes me as possibly unnecessary. If a new clause of this kind were to be incorporated, possibly with some elaboration, it may be wise to leave it at the personal circumstances of the victim.