My Lords, at the request of my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts and with the leave of the Committee, I shall move Amendment 64 and speak to the other amendments in this group. My noble friend Lord Hodgson had been hoping that the Committee would reach his amendments to Schedule 8 last week as unfortunately he is out of the country this week. I have to say, having agreed to be his understudy, that I shared his hopes. But it was not to be.
This is the first time that I have spoken on this Bill and I declare my interests as recorded in the register of interests. In particular, I am a non-executive director of the Royal Bank of Scotland, although I have absolutely no idea what the Royal Bank of Scotland’s view is on the Bill, and it has absolutely no idea that I am about to speak on it.
There are two distinct subgroups in this group of amendments. The first subgroup, led by Amendment 64 and including Amendments 67 and 68, deletes opt-out collective proceedings from Schedule 8. The second subgroup, comprising Amendments 65, 66, 69, 72 and 74, is more modest and seeks to ensure that some of the excesses of opt-out collective proceedings are avoided if the Government indeed wish to retain them in the Bill.
First, I will address why collective opt-out proceedings are an undesirable feature of the Bill and why I hope to persuade my noble friend the Minister to support Amendments 64, 67 and 68. The CBI does not support
opt-out collective proceedings and gave evidence to that effect in Committee in another place. It believes that it is not the best way to deliver redress to consumers and that the overseas evidence is that most of the financial settlement gets absorbed in legal costs. BIS has itself recognised that these proposals create incentives for intermediaries and that a proliferation of cases could impose significant burdens on businesses. My noble friend the Minister has already referred to this in the previous group of amendments.
In practice, if there were a large number of collective opt-out proceedings, that could end up distracting businesses from what we need businesses to do—to focus on growth, jobs, profits and wealth creation. If we do not get businesses focused on those things, we lose our most secure route to escape from the deficit and debt that still overhang our economy and are still holding us back.
I expect that if we get collective opt-out proceedings, the first wave will be targeted at major corporates as they will have the deepest pockets. They may be reasonably well placed to deal with such actions without putting their businesses at risk. But I have genuine concerns that collective opt-out actions will then move on to mid-corporates and indeed smaller companies, which could well be flattened by the possibility of a collective opt-out action. This is where not only the defence costs but the sheer effort of defence will weigh most heavily and are most likely to distract those businesses from what they do best—wealth creation.
Either way, if collective opt-out actions are threatened, the implications for cost and effort for the business, large or small, may well weigh the scales in favour of settlement rather than defence. Whether collective opt-out actions are settled or defended, the costs that businesses bear will end up in prices. Therefore, consumers will pay for any additional redress—there is no net gain for consumers. If there are additional costs for businesses in dealing with the impact of collective actions, that will flow through into businesses’ costs and therefore prices.
So on one side of the equation we have burdens on businesses, which will undoubtedly come from a significant number of collective actions, with the costs, if there are any, passed on to consumers; but on the other side of the equation there is no evidence that consumers— as opposed to representative groups that claim to speak for consumers—think that this is a price worth paying.
The evidence from the US, which has, as we know, a highly litigious society and extensive use of class actions, is that opt-out class actions do not satisfy consumers. Only a minority report receiving meaningful value from such actions and consumers report that they want to retain control over whether or not they are included in such actions. But more importantly, as the Minister has already said, there is evidence that the real beneficiaries are not the consumers; they are the lawyers and the litigation funders who sometimes take hundreds of times more than the amount that was actually distributed to the consumers in the form of redress. So there are very real costs and somewhat illusory benefits at play here.
The European Commission is much more cautious about opt-out proceedings than our own Government. Commissioner Reding, who is not normally one of my favourite people, has described the Commission’s own proposals as a,
“balanced approach to improve access to justice for citizens while avoiding a US-style system of class actions and the risk of frivolous claims and abusive litigation”.
The Commission’s proposals include a general principle of opt-in rather than opt-out actions, and indeed stress the desirability of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in preference to legal actions. This Bill could not be categorised as falling within Commissioner Reding’s balanced approach.
I am aware that the Government believe that sufficient safeguards have been set out in the Bill. The ban on exemplary damages and damages-based agreements, while welcome, will not remove the huge incentive for lawyers and litigation funders to make a handsome living out of exploiting these provisions. I expect that the Minister will also rely on the Competition Appeal Tribunal’s control over those who can act as representatives by virtue of subsection (8) of proposed new Section 47B, which will be inserted by paragraph 5 of Schedule 8. I have great admiration for the competence of the tribunal in competition matters, but I do have concerns that so much will depend on how the tribunal exercises its discretion in this area—territory with which it is unfamiliar. Whether we end up with a US-style litigation environment will not be determined by Parliament but by the tribunal. I hope that I am not alone in being uncomfortable about this. That is why my noble friend Lord Hodgson has tabled his amendments to remove the collective opt-out provisions from the Bill. They impose burdens on business and would seem to yield few benefits for consumers. They certainly seem to benefit litigation funders and lawyers, but not anyone else.
As I have already mentioned, my second set of amendments in this group is predicated on the Government remaining wedded to the opt-out principle. The amendments, including Amendment 65, are designed to mitigate dependence on the tribunal. Under subsection (8) of proposed new Section 47B, the tribunal must conclude that it is “just and reasonable” for a person to act as a representative in collective proceedings. The effect of Amendments 65, 66 and 69 would be to place quite specific restrictions on this so that lawyers, claims management organisations and others who gain from the litigation itself cannot themselves satisfy the just and reasonable test. In addition to the usual suspects of specialist legal firms, claims management companies and lookalikes, these amendments would rule out funds and other bodies which are established to promote collective proceedings and to gain from their pursuit.
Amendments 72 and 74 are variations on the same theme. Proposed new Section 47C of the Competition Act inserted by paragraph 6 of Schedule 8 makes damages-based agreements unenforceable in relation to opt-out proceedings. These amendments add third-party litigation funding agreements. Damages-based agreements are too narrow a concept. As I indicated earlier, the incentive may well not be damages and gaining access to those, but simply the ability to be able to siphon off legal and other fees related to the litigation.
My noble friend the Minister is aware that the Law Society has taken a keen interest in these proposals and I hope that, as a minimum, she will agree to meet it and interested members of your Lordships’ House, between Committee and Report, to discuss how best to deal with these very real concerns. I beg to move.
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