My Lords, I was some way from leaving that point. I will get there in a moment. There is also the question of whether any orders made would be confirmed. The right to apply provisions will be supplemented by guidance that will effectively act as a presumption to divert or extinguish public rights of way that pass through the curtilage of family homes where privacy, safety or security are a problem.
Under the right to apply provisions, any appeal made by an applicant, whether it is because the local authority has refused an application or because it has failed to confirm a diversion order it has made, will be submitted to the Secretary of State for a decision. The Government will therefore be in a prime position to promote implementation of the revised policy set out in the guidance by setting a clear precedent in those decisions. A draft of the guidance has been deposited in the Library of your Lordships’ House. We recognise that it needs further refinement, which is why it remains open for comment.
The rights of way reforms will also give local authorities more scope to deal with objections to orders themselves rather than having to submit every single opposed order to the Secretary of State as at present. The combined effect of these provisions will offer the prospect of real improvement for those people experiencing problems with a public right of way across their property. We want to evaluate how the measures work out in practice before seeking to add to the legislative burden.
The issue of intrusive public rights of way is very emotive. I understand why it arouses strong feelings and why those affected want something done. While
putting a presumption on the face of the Act might seem desirable, the new clauses would create regulation where it is likely to prove unnecessary and create more problems than it resolves. The clauses proposed by my noble friend would impose a duty on each local authority to divert or extinguish every right of way that passes through the curtilage of a residential dwelling unless they are satisfied that the privacy, safety or security of the premises are not adversely affected by the right of way and extinguishing it would not remove access to a vital local service or amenity not otherwise reasonably accessible.
Carrying out a survey to identify rights of way that fulfil these criteria would place a significant new burden on local authorities. The proposed clauses would also have the effect of removing the tests in current legislation that ensure that the public interest in the right of way is safeguarded where that right of way passes through the curtilage of a residential dwelling. My concern is that the proposed new clauses do not strike the right balance between public and private interests, which is critical to the agreement reached over the guidance by the stakeholder working group. I invite your Lordships to agree that legislative solutions imposed without a consensus or consultation could result in more disputes and legal challenges.
As the draft guidance on diversions and extinguishments has been developed by the stakeholder working group, it is founded on a strong stakeholder consensus, which means that it is likely to be complied with. We firmly believe that solutions based on agreement and mutual interest result in less conflict, as several noble Lords have said, and less need for enforcement in the long run. The stakeholder working group consensus is the result of many years of hard work and difficult discussions between stakeholders who have commendably agreed to put their differences to one side and work towards solutions that are for the common good. We should not risk putting all that progress in jeopardy by adopting measures that are not founded on that agreement. These proposed new clauses would impose a significant new burden on local authorities and all but remove the current public interest tests.
My noble friend Lord Skelmersdale questioned the right to apply and whether the guidance would have the intended effect. There is pretty clear agreement among stakeholders that the major difficulty for landowners is in getting local authorities to make a diversion or extinguishment order in the first place. Our plans to implement and extend the scope of the right to apply provisions for such orders will overcome this, because landowners will be able formally to apply and appeal if the authority refuses to make an order or fails to respond.
The other hurdle is getting orders confirmed. However, according to Ramblers, which keeps accurate records of these matters, of the slightly in excess of 1,200 diversion orders which have reached a conclusion in the last three years, 94% did not attract any objections. Of the remaining 6%, less than 1% were not confirmed following submission to the Secretary of State. I am not saying that 100% of proposed diversions should necessarily go through. Clearly, that would depend on the proposal’s merits. However, given those statistics
we believe that the combination of the right-to-apply provisions and the guidance will have the desired effect and that we should not rush to legislate before seeing how these measures work out in practice.
My noble friend Lord Skelmersdale asked why a landowner should have to meet the entire cost of a diversion and I understand his concerns. Where the diversion or removal of an existing right of way is for the benefit of the property owner rather than for the public, I think it is not unreasonable that the property owner should meet the cost. Authorities will not be able to recover more than the actual costs and would have to make clear exactly what was covered by those costs. In addition, as part of the rights of way reforms package, we will be introducing a framework within which local authorities will be required to make it clear to landowners what each stage of the process will cost and what they will be getting for that money.
We expect the costs of making alterations to public rights of way to reduce as a result of the reforms package as a whole, specifically through the following measures: significantly reducing the cost of publicising orders; giving local authorities more discretion to disregard spurious or irrelevant objections; making the exchange of written representations the default for dealing with opposed orders, rather than a public inquiry; and encouraging local authorities to enable landowners to make their own arrangements for undertaking some of the work normally undertaken by the local authority.
My noble friend also asked about the likely average costs to a landowner of diverting or extinguishing a right of way. Those costs will of course vary considerably across the country. They will depend on whether the relevant order is objected to and whether the matter goes to a public inquiry. Information we have gathered through our work gives us an estimated average cost, over a range of circumstances, for making and implementing a legal order to divert or extinguish a public right of way. The least cost is where an order is unopposed or written representations are used to deal with any objections; these average less than £2,500. Costs increase to an average of more than £8,000 where a public inquiry is held and experts and barristers are appointed.
I turn to my noble friend Lady Byford’s Amendment 17. This proposed new clause would give the Secretary of State the powers to issue statutory guidance on the making and confirming of a range of orders to divert or extinguish public rights of way. I recognise that the objective here is to give a statutory basis to the draft guidance on the diversions and extinguishment of rights of way that has been agreed by the stakeholder working group and placed in the House’s Library. We developed this draft guidance in collaboration with the stakeholder working group. The guidance sets out the proposed government policy on the diversion or extinguishment of rights of way that pass through gardens, farmyards and commercial premises. It effectively acts as a presumption to divert or extinguish public rights of way that pass through such properties where privacy, safety or security is a problem and exhorts confirming authorities to act on that presumption, wherever possible.
We have great sympathy for those people who experience problems with public rights of way that pass through the garden of their family home. We are on track to implement the right-to-apply provisions introduced by the Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000, which give landowners the right to apply for diversion or extinguishment of a right of way. Through clauses in the Bill, we are amending the provisions in such a way as to enable people with rights of way through their gardens to make applications under those provisions. With the right-to-apply provisions in place, local authorities will no longer be able to ignore requests for rights of way to be moved or extinguished, or dismiss them out of hand. They will be obliged to make an order or justify their reasons for not doing so, on appeal to the Secretary of State.
There is of course also the question of whether any orders made would be confirmed. Under the right-to-apply provisions, the Secretary of State will be the confirming authority for all disputed orders. Government will, as I have said, therefore be in a prime position to promote implementation of the revised policy set out in the guidance, by setting a clear precedent.
As I have said, getting broad agreement on this guidance is a fairly significant development. Because it has been developed by the stakeholder working group, there is a strong consensus on it. I am sure that the Committee will agree that new measures such as this are more likely to prove successful in practice because they have been introduced through agreement among stakeholders, regardless of whether they have statutory backing.
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We should not lose sight of the fact that this is a Deregulation Bill, the purpose of which is to minimise the statutory burden rather than increase it. I believe that the combined effect of the right to reply and the new guidance will offer the prospect of real improvement of the position of those people experiencing problems with a public right of way across their property. We should evaluate how the measures work out in practice before seeking to add to the legislative burden by making the guidance statutory.
I turn to my noble friend Lady Byford’s Amendment 18. We recognise that an amendment to extend the powers to authorise gates and similar structures could be helpful to landowners, householders and farmers who have rights of way going through their premises or garden, and for reasons of security or safety wish to install a gate to help to protect their family or business. We have considerable sympathy with those people who experience problems with a public right of way in those circumstances. This issue was put to the stakeholder working group, which discussed it at some length. While there was agreement about the proposal in principle, the group has not yet arrived at a formulation on which it could agree. At the same time, concerns have been expressed by users of rights of way about the possible proliferation of gates and other structures across those rights of way if the current restraints were to be removed. Particular concern has been expressed by equestrian groups, who already have concerns about the extension of powers to authorise gates on byways
in Clause 25 of the Bill. They are particularly concerned about riders with disabilities, who may not be able to dismount or who have difficulties in opening and closing gates.
In the light of those concerns, we have concluded that we cannot rely on stakeholder agreement around such a proposal, and that pressing ahead with it would put stakeholder consensus at risk. We believe that the combined effect of the right to apply and the new guidance will offer the prospect of a real improvement in the position of those people experiencing problems with a public right of way across their property, and that we should evaluate how the measures work out in practice before seeking to legislate further—for example, through this amendment. On the basis of what I have said, I hope that I have persuaded my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.