My Lords, Clause 53 amends the Juries Act 1974, raising the upper age limit for jury service from 70 to 75 years of age. Raising the age limit to 75 will mean that juries better reflect the current demographic make-up of the adult population and will allow juries to benefit from the experience and knowledge of those aged 70 to 75. The existing age limit for jury service was set by the Criminal Justice Act 1988, which raised the upper age limit from 65 to 70. However, that was more than 25 years ago, and it does not reflect the current healthy life expectancy of older people in England and Wales. On that basis, we believe that it is reasonable to expect people aged up to and including 75 to sit as jurors if summoned.
Amendments 69B and 69C would remove the upper age limit altogether. That would be a very different matter. Over the age of 75, there is an increasing risk that people would be unable to perform jury service and as a consequence would seek to be excused for that reason. We do not believe it would be right to put people in those circumstances to the trouble of having to apply for excusal, or indeed to burden the taxpayer with the additional cost of administering those excusals. Our view is that the appropriate age limit is 75. I will, in due course, ask the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment and will argue that Clause 53 should stand part of the Bill.
As to Amendment 69D, Clause 54 provides a judge with the power to order members of the jury to surrender their electronic communications devices for a period. The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, asked me to define that. I respectfully refer him to Clause 55(2)(5), where it says that,
“‘electronic communications device’ means a device that is designed or adapted for a use which consists of or includes the sending or receiving of signals that are transmitted by means of an electronic communications network (as defined in section 32 of the Communications Act 2003)”.
I hope that clears things up for the noble Lord.
The Government do not believe that the term “limit the use of” is sufficiently clear. It would allow jurors to retain their devices in the jury room even when a judge thought it necessary in the interests of justice that the devices should not be available to the jury during their deliberations. The Law Commission recommended
that devices should be surrendered and we believe that this is right. The provision provides judges with the discretion when making an order to take account of circumstances. They can only do so when the order is necessary or expedient in the interests of justice, and proportionate to that aim. With those assurances, I ask the noble Lord not to press that amendment. Usually, jurors will be able to use their devices and they may be required by the judge or the coroner in some circumstances when they are deliberating to surrender their electronic communication device, but it is not a blanket ban on the use of devices at other times or a blanket ban for the duration of the jury service.
Clause 55 also provides powers for a judge to order court security officers to conduct a search of a member of the jury so as to determine whether the juror has failed to surrender a device in accordance with an order made under Clause 54. We have aimed to ensure that the power to search is not an overly intrusive one, and goes no further than is necessary to ensure that a judge’s order, made in the interests of justice, is complied with.
Clause 55 also provides powers for security officers to retain articles surrendered or seized. If it is not possible to enforce the judge’s order, there will be a much greater risk that devices would be retained and potentially used during deliberations, thus bringing a risk of an offence being committed. It would also be harder to bring a successful prosecution and thus would reduce the effectiveness of the measures we are taking to deal with juror misconduct. I therefore argue that the clause should stand part of the Bill.
Amendments 69E and 69F would remove the requirement that proceedings for the new offences of researching a case and sharing that research with other jurors should be brought only by or with the consent of the Attorney-General. These offences concern damage to the administration of justice and public confidence in it. The Attorney-General is well established as the guardian of the public interest in the administration of justice. This is evident in, for example, his responsibility for bringing or consenting to proceedings in the case of contempt.
We believe that the Attorney-General should continue to maintain oversight of the public interest where such juror misconduct arises. Proceedings are very rare and we believe that the close involvement of the Attorney-General in cases of juror contempt should continue when such misconduct is prosecuted as an offence. I fear that I cannot support this amendment and urge the noble Lord not to press it.
Amendment 69G would change the scope of the offence in Clause 58, which inserts a new Section 20C into the Juries Act 1974. The proposed offence stems from a case before the Divisional Court in 2013 where a juror had posted on Facebook the fact that he was trying a defendant charged with a sexual offence on a child, and suggested an intention on the juror’s part not to try the case fairly. We want to ensure that proper criminal sanctions and procedures apply where a juror engages in behaviour that can give rise to a suggestion that they will not try the case fairly. Such
behaviour brings the jury system into disrepute, leads to the perception of unfair trials and potentially causes trials to collapse.
We committed to and have given very careful consideration to the amendment proposed. The effect of the amendment would be to change the offence from an objective test to one that was more subjective. It would therefore be difficult to prosecute and prove and there is a risk that it would need to be proved that the juror did have that intention. Our view is that it should be a criminal offence where a juror intentionally posts material on the internet and that material allows someone reasonably to conclude that the juror is, for example, biased for or against the defendant. This conduct could throw doubt on the fairness of the trial and lead to it being stopped or result in an appeal. There is also an additional precaution in the use of the offence that any prosecution requires the consent of the Attorney-General. I therefore cannot agree to this amendment and ask the noble Lord not to press it.
Amendment 69H would add an exception to the offence in new Section 20D to provide that it is not an offence to disclose information for the purpose of allowing approved academic research into jury deliberations—the matter specifically referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy. We believe that it is of the utmost importance that the confidentiality of jury deliberations is protected and that disclosure is permitted only where absolutely necessary. If the amendment were made, it would mean that approved academic research into substantive jury deliberations would be allowed.
The Law Commission recommended that research should be allowed into the substantive content of jury deliberations. It suggested that this type of research could be used to inform and undertake reform to improve the jury system, while enhancing public understanding of trial by jury. However, as noted by noble Lords at Second Reading, research into juries currently does take place. Academics are currently able to undertake meaningful and important research without infringing Section 8. Indeed, during the Bill’s public evidence session, Professor Cheryl Thomas, the leading academic regarding jurors and jury trials, commented that she had,
“never been hampered by section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981”.
Personally, I have sympathy with the amendment, in the sense that a fundamental system of trying the most serious criminal offences should not be beyond examination by academic research. Any restrictions need justification. However, the Government will be responding shortly to the Law Commission’s recommendations on this matter. I therefore cannot agree to this amendment and ask the noble Lord not to press it.
As to Amendment 69J, the objective of the new clause is to ensure that jurors understand their responsibilities. That is something on which all noble Lords can agree and much is already done to that end. A video about the role of the juror, which is shown to all jurors, makes clear that only evidence adduced in court should be considered. It explains that jurors should not carry out research into the case or disclose
information about it and that doing so could amount to contempt of court. The Criminal Practice Directions require trial judges to give similar instructions to jury members.
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