My Lords, in moving Amendment 79D, I will speak to the other amendments and on whether the clause should stand part of the Bill. In so far as there are issues to address about the discharge of planning permissions, it is suggested that these can be dealt with in another way than that provided for in the Bill. As it stands, the clause is yet another example of central government disempowering local planning authorities.
The ability to impose conditions is an important part of the planning process. They are an alternative to outright refusal of planning permission and therefore an aid to development. By potentially mitigating the adverse effects of the development, they can enable it to proceed. If conditions are imposed, it is important that they are properly discharged, otherwise the system is undermined. Of course, conditions should not be spurious; they should be carefully justified and relate to clear planning issues and policy. They are usually an interlocking set of measures designed to ensure that the development does not harm the public interest.
The NPPF states that:
“Planning conditions should only be imposed where they are necessary, relevant to planning and to the development to be permitted, enforceable, precise and reasonable in all other respects”.
The Planning Portal has compiled a set of model planning conditions. There is a right of appeal against what might be considered an inappropriate condition. By way of example, conditions might include requirements for a development to be completed in accordance with lifetime homes standards; for a commercial premises to have cleaning and extraction equipment approved by the LPA; for a restriction on the activity that can be carried out in or from particular premises; or for the protection of, say, an archaeological site. To have these conditions unfulfilled could materially affect the well-being of individuals and negate the planning process.
Of course, local planning authorities should not be entitled to sit and ignore and not sign off situations where conditions have been properly fulfilled, but the route of deemed consent is a heavy-handed and dangerous remedy. We have no idea how it is to be implemented. For a start, the deeming process will proceed by way of a development order, which is subject only to the negative parliamentary procedure. There does not appear to be any provision requiring an applicant to have attempted or succeeded in discharging the conditions for the deeming to be applied—hence Amendment 80.
No judgment is required of the Secretary of State as to whether any adverse consequences for the community would arise from a discharge—hence Amendment 81. There are lessening opportunities to mitigate the adverse impacts on public amenities, health and well-being—hence Amendment 79D. There seems to be the prospect that the applicant himself may be given the opportunity to decide when the deemed discharge is to take effect, and no rationale is offered for this—hence Amendment 82. There is no certain relief from the deeming or any delays in the local planning authority responding within the given period that are wholly or partly caused by statutory consultees, the applicant or indeed anyone else. In short, we have no idea how this proposition is to be applied, and we trust that the Minister will be able to give us at least some comfort today.
If a development has been frustrated by unreasonable conditions in the first place, and a failure to address their discharge in the second, it is of course reasonable that the matter is addressed. But the work of the LGA, in conjunction with the BPF, the Planning Officers Society and the Home Builders Federation, should clearly be given a chance before these draconian measures are taken.
In conclusion, perhaps I might ask some questions of the Minister. Could this lead to conditions not having to be implemented or acted on? If so, in what circumstances can that happen? For example, in response to the Killian Pretty report, the then Government identified the use of approved contractors and a fast-track appeals process for matters concerned only with the discharge of conditions. Have the Government given any further consideration to that route, rather than the one adopted in this clause? What research have the Government undertaken to determine why local authorities are not responding to the application for consent, agreement or approval in due time? What is the extent of this failure? In how many local planning authorities has this happened, and how frequently? What consideration have the Government given to the potential negative effect of this clause in discouraging some essential conditions on the basis that the local planning authority has the capacity to deal only with other, fewer conditions—thereby impacting on the quality of development? What is the Government’s assessment of the capacity of local planning authority departments to deal with this, given the huge reductions in funding that local authorities have had to endure?
These are hugely important issues that go to the heart of our planning process, and I look forward to the support of other noble Lords and the Minister’s response. I beg to move.