My Lords, I seek to assist the House, first by defining the concept of exit that my amendment aims to address, and then by responding to the concerns raised by the Minister in Committee about this important issue.
My interest in this matter began when I was one of the Ministers in another place who was responsible for the privatisation of the water industry, working at that time with my noble friend Lord Howard and the late and much missed Nick Ridley. Our aim was to introduce competition into the industry, to improve services and water quality, and to ensure that, through access to the capital markets, the industry could undertake significant, long-term investment into much needed new infrastructure. The fact that in the six years after privatisation the companies invested £17 billion, compared to £9.3 billion in the six years before privatisation, with higher-quality water, demonstrates the benefits of that measure.
My amendment seeks to take competition further by recognising the distinction between the wholesale process of delivering key water and sewerage on the one hand, and, on the other, encouraging the 18 incumbent water companies to separate off their retail services. These retail services are customer-facing. They are likely to include water efficiency advice and implementation—including benefit sharing—water harvesting and sustainable drainage, and more efficient and effective billing and payment options.
In Scotland since April 2008, non-household customers have been able to choose their supplier and/or renegotiate the terms of their supply. During that time, levels of service have improved considerably and there has been a much clearer focus on environmental services. Some two-thirds of customers have actively opted for a better deal, and the safeguards that have been put in place ensure that no customer, household or non-household, is worse off as a result of the introduction of competition. Indeed, in Scotland, Scottish Water opted legally to separate its non-household activities from the rest of its business by creating a new subsidiary company called Business Stream.
My amendment echoes government policy to allow the most efficient companies to merge or new companies to enter the market to provide customers with better service. The amendment goes further and allows those companies that are inefficient or in favour of exiting the market to apply to the Secretary of State to leave. This proposed move away from vertically integrated, private sector monopolies is to be welcomed. It allows companies that want to specialise in major long-term infrastructure to do so. However, it also allows others—such as the Singapore company Sembcorp, which owns Bournemouth Water, one of the world-leading facility managers for large industrial companies with process management skills—the opportunity, if they so choose, to offer retail services to a far wider base of customers
than they do now. For today, they can compete only under current legislation by buying every customer, one by one.
The Bill takes a leap forward from 25 years of supply-driven legislation to a focus on much needed, demand-led service. In Scotland, such legislation has worked well since its introduction in 2008. However, it is deeply concerning that, unless we amend the Bill, we will create a competitive market but we will also create a market that prevents those participants that wish to exit the market doing so. For example, if, hypothetically, the board of Thames Water and its investors wanted to exit the retail business and specialise in the very different skill sets required for its core business—major infrastructure projects, which cover more than 90% of its current business—the company would not be allowed to do so. All the incumbent companies today would have to keep offices, keep the staff, keep the IT systems, pay rates and rent, and build up a cost base to be passed on to their customers, even if the board and shareholders wanted to exit the market and, in extremis, even if the company had only a handful of customers.
Only last week, Oxera published a study on the potential cost of passing the Bill without a provision for exit, and came to the view that this measure could amount to around £190 million in NPV terms over a 10-year period. Of course, this is not surprising. If we continue to insist in this legislation that the non-household, retail divisions of the incumbents have to maintain the capability of running the infrastructure systems needed and lose market share, they will end up with rising costs relative to their revenues, they could see losses increase and continue, and no cost synergies would be possible.
Exit is based on straightforward market efficiencies. The Defra Select Committee supported exit. An increasing number of water companies advocate exit. The Scottish experience is a case study for the benefit of exit. The Water Industry Commission for Scotland has come out in support. Macquarie has published a research note and it supports exit. I quote some investors with whom I have been in touch. One says, “Companies should be allowed to exit”. A second says, “If loss-making, it will be detrimental to regulated business to be forced in keeping them”, whereas a third says that it is eminently sensible to be allowed to do so. A final one states, “Anything that promotes competitive tension to improve the customer experience is positive”.
The chief executive of Ofwat, Cathryn Ross, on 3 December last year gave the following evidence to the Water Bill Public Bill Committee:
“Our view is that retail exit for incumbents is a critically important element of a functioning, effective retail market. Particularly important is the fact that if we do not allow incumbents to exit, essentially we are mandating inefficient retailers’ remaining in the market. That will basically be baking in cost that customers will have to pay for, which we can easily avoid”.—[Official Report, Commons, Water Bill Committee, 3/12/13; col. 7.]
Even in your Lordships’ House in Committee there was harmony, agreement and support between, on the one hand, my noble friend Lord Crickhowell— the first, and indeed outstanding, chairman of the National Rivers Authority, appointed during privatisation —the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, and the Labour Benches
behind him, and the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, from the Cross Benches, who would in fact go one step further in enabling exit and competition between householders as well as non-householders.