My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Selborne for explaining once again his concerns to your Lordships. I laid out the government position on this matter clearly during Committee, and I confirm to my noble friend Lord Deben that I do indeed take this matter very seriously. I am happy to clarify the position for your Lordships again this afternoon.
My noble friend’s Amendments 2 to 29 and 31 to 36 would break the link between upstream and retail. While I know that this is not my noble friend’s intention, it would have the practical effect of derailing the reforms which this Bill seeks to introduce. The amendments would introduce a market where incumbents would tender for new water resources under the so-called single-buyer model. That is extremely incumbent-friendly, and would seriously undermine the competition that we are seeking to extend in the Bill.
The single-buyer approach, with decisions resting with the incumbent, will provide fewer rights and less flexibility for new entrants. These amendments would allow incumbents to dictate the future direction of upstream markets. This would, I suggest, present a considerable barrier to entry for new entrants. Only licensees who were able to bid for and win contracts under the terms set by the incumbent would be able to enter the market. Most importantly, it would not lead, I suggest, to a better outcome for customers. For example, there would be an increase in charges if incumbents introduced overly burdensome standards in tenders or made poor decisions over which bids to accept.
As I have said, I know that my noble friend’s intention was certainly not to undermine the market reform provisions of the Water Bill. I have heard his argument that this approach would mirror arrangements being introduced in Scotland, but this is not Scotland. The Scottish Government have taken a policy decision not to introduce upstream competition in Scotland, and that is their prerogative, but that does not mean that is the right approach for England. We face a more challenging water resource situation than our friends north of the border, and we are legislating here for a regime in England. Reducing the scope for innovation and entry into the market is not going to help deliver the change we need. I hope I have explained why I cannot accept the tabled amendments.
I know that my noble friend’s concern is about de-averaging in a more general sense, so perhaps I can take this opportunity to provide some comfort on that issue. The averaging or de-averaging of charges refers to the extent to which an individual customer’s bill reflects the direct costs associated with serving that customer. Some would suggest that a de-averaging of charges will somehow be a direct result of increasing levels of competition in this sector. However, there is no evidence to support this view. Averaged charges are a common feature across the networked utilities and, indeed, in all sorts of industries that are subject to market pressures. We think it is right that network charges should continue to be averaged, and the regulator has stated, repeatedly, that it has all the tools necessary to control the effect of de-averaging on customer charges.
The Government’s charging principles are unambiguous on this. Ofwat must not allow de-averaging that is harmful to customers, and that includes rural customers, to which my noble friend specifically referred. Our charging guidance will follow soon. I am happy to commit, as I have done before, to making it plain in that document that there must be strong, definitive boundaries on the scope of any de-averaging and that households, in particular, must be protected. There are powers in this Bill which the Government will not be afraid to use if Ofwat’s charging rules are not consistent with our charging guidance. I thank my noble friend Lady Parminter for her words.
However, we should not be simplistic. There is no doubt that there are areas where better cost-reflectivity could have substantial benefits for the environment and for the resilience of our water supplies. It must be right that the new upstream markets should reflect the environmental costs of supply. It must also be right that there are economic incentives for business users that use large volumes of water, and it must be right that water companies should seek to identify the most environmentally efficient sources of water. The Bill is all about opening the market, encouraging new entrants and increasing the resilience of our supplies. Better cost-reflectivity in the competitive part of the non-household market is a crucial part of this.
My noble friend suggested that new entrants will not focus on value-added services. He may not have put it like that, but that was the intent behind one of the points he made. New entrants already in the market, such as Business Stream, are very clear that they see value-added services as the best way to maximise profit, so I cannot accept that the way the Bill is designed makes that less likely.
My noble friend raised an important point about fears that the Government’s charging guidance and Ofwat’s charging rules might be overridden by competition law. I draw your Lordships’ attention to paragraph 5 of Schedule 3 to the Competition Act 1998. This provides for an exemption from competition law where an agreement is made in order to comply with a legal requirement imposed by or under any enactment in force in the United Kingdom. Ofwat’s statutory charging rules will take the form of a legal requirement imposed under such an enactment. The Bill provides the Secretary of State with the power of veto over the charging rules in order to ensure that regulatory practice remains well aligned with government policy. I can also confirm that there is no general prohibition in EU law against average pricing.
My noble friend raised the case of Shotton and Albion Water as a legal precedent to support the case that de-averaging is a real risk. This was a complex and long-running case. However, it is a misunderstanding to describe it as a case of de-averaging. Shotton was a very unusual case from which it is not useful to extrapolate more widely. For example, it concerned a discrete system that serves only two customers, one of which was served by Albion Water. This is very rare. To give some context, the case represented 0.01% of Welsh Water’s turnover. At the time of the dispute, this agreement was not subject to regulation by Ofwat. The Bill includes measures that would bring all such
transfers within the scope of the regulatory regime. Ministerial guidance and Ofwat’s charging rules will therefore set out how charges between water companies and inset appointees such as Albion Water should be determined in the future.
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The necessary safeguards are already in place. The Bill will put in place a robust, binding framework for the regulator as to how charges will be set, and when they may or may not be averaged. We are confident that these tools are fit for purpose. Customers will be protected, and that includes rural customers; our charging principles are explicit on that. I have said before that this view is supported by competition experts, to which my noble friend Lady Parminter referred. For these reasons, I hope that my noble friend will be reassured and feel able to withdraw his amendment.