My Lords, as noble Lords will recall, Amendment 1 was moved by the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, on Report in this House and agreed to by a majority of 18 votes.
Amendment 1 would extend the scope of the register to those who lobby special advisers, in addition to those who lobby Ministers and Permanent Secretaries. Our colleagues in the other place recognised the objective of the amendment and, indeed, expressed some sympathy with the motives of those who had supported it. They concluded, however, that the case had not been made to extend the scope in this way at present, but recognised that discussions regarding the inclusion of those who communicate with special advisers will continue. They therefore proposed what I believe is a pragmatic and constructive response to the noble Lord’s amendment. The amendments in lieu proposed by the other place would introduce a power for the Minister to amend the definition of consultant lobbying provided for by Clause 2 to, subsequently, and if necessary, include communications with special advisers. Such a power would enable Ministers to extend the scope as suggested if and when they are persuaded in this Government or the next of the case for doing so.
As I have observed, the other place was not persuaded that the case for such an extension had yet been made. That is because it recognises that the register is intended to complement the existing government transparency regime. Both systems—transparency and the register—are intended to enhance the transparency of the key decision-makers, the Ministers and Permanent Secretaries, and those who communicate with them. The other place confirmed this view that the Government’s focus on key decision-makers is appropriate and proportionate. We accept that lobbyists make communications to Government other than directly to Ministers and Permanent Secretaries. Ultimately, however, it is for Ministers and Permanent Secretaries to be responsible for the decisions taken within their departments.
While special advisers may provide advice, they are not decision-makers. It is Ministers, not special advisers, who are ultimately responsible for the actions of their departments; and it is Permanent Secretaries who are the officers accountable to Parliament for the performance of those departments. It is therefore only right that Ministers and Permanent Secretaries—not special advisers—are the main focus of the meeting reporting system, and the main focus of the register.
Special advisers are defined by the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, which includes the requirement that they are a person,
“appointed to assist a Minister of the Crown after being selected for the appointment by that Minister personally”.
That Act also provides for a statutory code for special advisers that makes clear that they may not,
“(a) authorise the expenditure of public funds; (b) exercise any power in relation to the management of any part of the civil service of the State; (c) otherwise exercise any”,
statutory or prerogative power.
As that code makes clear, the employment of special advisers adds a political dimension to the advice and assistance available to Ministers. They are an additional resource for the Minister, providing assistance from a standpoint that is more politically committed and politically aware than is available from the permanent Civil Service. The Government do not, therefore, intend that communications with them be captured by the meeting reporting system, nor by the register.
The other place recognised that the amendment proposed by this House would dissociate the register from its main objective, which is to complement the existing system by extending the transparency we apply to decision-makers to those that seek to influence them. They agreed by a substantial majority of 53 that Lords Amendment 1 be disagreed with, and replaced by the proposed Amendments 1A and 1B. In so doing, they have proposed a constructive compromise that would allow the scope of the register to be expanded to capture communications with special advisers, if the case is that it should do so.
The amendments in lieu should assuage the concerns of those who have asked that we do not eliminate the possibility of expanding the scope if justified in the future. I hope therefore that noble Lords will reconsider their position, and recognise that the amendments in lieu represent the most pragmatic and proportionate approach to this matter at present. I beg to move.