My Lords, this amendment takes us back to the thorny issue of council tax at referendums. We have just heard from the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, about his opposition to centrally imposed targets; he has been very consistent on that issue. The fundamental policy change provided for in the Bill is
the inclusion of the definition of a relevant amount of council tax—certain levies. Previously, any increase in council tax resulting from an increase in levies could not have caused a determination that the level of council tax was excessive, and would not have triggered a referendum requirement.
Debates in your Lordships’ House and in the other place highlighted a number of concerns, namely that the referendum regime places the burden on major preceptors and billing authorities who have no direct ability to influence the amount of the levy or to cause a levy body to reduce its levy; that factoring in 2013-14 council tax increases into referendum criteria introduces an element of retrospection potentially penalising authorities for decisions made before the Bill was introduced; and that it would undermine certain infrastructure projects that relied on an increase in levy stream and that were negotiated as part of a city deal. The example of Leeds has been cited in this regard.
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These concerns have not been met, either in the other place or by the amendments before us today. As we have heard, the amendments provide an alternative route to the council tax at referendums coming into force, as originally envisaged on Royal Assent, or by order. Which route is taken depends upon whether or not Royal Assent is received by 5 February; that is the date by which the referendum principles should be put to Parliament for approval. We hear from the Minister that it is quite likely that Royal Assent will be received by that date; I doubt whether anything this evening will disrupt that judgment. Should Royal Assent be received after that date, the referendum provisions will operate from 2015, rather than April 2014. However, even if they do so, that does not help with the concerns over retrospection. The amendments make clear that the Secretary of State can determine categories of authority for that year based on whether their increases in either the year beginning 1 April 2013 or 1 April 2014 or both were deemed excessive on the new principles. Frankly, this does not leave a very satisfactory state of affairs.
We have been tempted to amend the amendments at least by removing the April 2013 date from proposed new Clause 39(19)(a), but—particularly as this looks increasingly now to be just a precautionary amendment —we consider that for the time being the issue has been debated enough, so we will not resist these amendments.